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Abstract 
 
Joint Operations at the external borders of the EU are axiomatic for EU’s border 
management policy and constitute forms of collective action involving the efforts of 
two or more Member States for the purpose of securing the common borders. 
Nevertheless, participation in joint operations is based on voluntarism and guided by the 
principle of solidarity, which should act as catalysts encouraging MSs’ participation in 
Joint Operations. Scrutinising the phenomenon from the perspective of collective action 
theory offered both a theoretical and empirical puzzle, since states, as rational actors, 
would be expected to ‘free-ride’. Yet, despite the voluntary nature and the lack of 
institutional ‘coercion’, Member States do participate extensively in joint operations. 
This raised a bi-dimensional enquiry, related to the question of motivations behind MSs’ 
participation, and adjacently to patterns of participation in Joint Operations. 
Regarding motivations, the findings of the paper seem to suggest that participation in 
joint operations has been predominantly security-driven and connected to the provision 
of border/internal security (as collective goods), but also, to a certain extent norm-
driven, and connected to the provision of refugee/migrant protection (as collective 
good). A salient finding was that the Member States’ security concerns have led to the 
appropriation of solidarity for security-ends and, as such, to ‘securitized’ solidarity.  
Regarding patterns, the findings seem to suggest a positive correlation between the 
degree of commitment to human rights of Member States and the degree of 
participation, but almost no correlation between the state’s geographic propinquity to 
the external borders and participation. 
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1 Introduction  
The abolishment of the internal borders, the establishment of the Schengen area and the 
free movement of people’s principle, enshrined in the European Union (EU) primary 
legal basis, have relinquished de facto sovereign prerogatives of Member States (MSs) 
over territorial borders (Sperling, 2013: 203) and led to a “spatial turn” (Wolff, 2008: 
254), due to the emergence of new borders and spaces. Currently, the EU’s external 
borders amount to 11.700 km of land, respectively 45.500 km of sea border, of which 
approximately half represents the Southern maritime border (Frontex, 2014g: 11). The 
external borders of the EU constitute a matter of co-responsibility, although in practice 
the ‘burden’ of securing the borders falls primarily on the ‘gate-keepers’ of Europe – the 
external border MSs. As such, the “spatial turn” has created multi-dimensional 
interdependencies between MSs, and the porous external borders led to increased pan-
European concerns about “‘unconventional’, ‘asymmetric’ and ‘transnational’ threats” 
(Bossong and Rhinard, 2013: 130), such as irregular migration and cross-border crime 
(Rijpma, 2009). 
This led to reinforced cooperation of MSs in the field of border management through 
the set-up of operational cooperation at the external borders, the most eloquent form of 
which are joint operations (JOs). JOs constitute ‘collective actions’ that are coordinated 
by Frontex, hosted by MSs and involve the participation of other MSs and their 
financial, human and logistic support (Nováky, 2011: 3). Nonetheless, they rely on 
voluntary participation of the MSs and participation should be guided by the principle 
of solidarity. Viewed from the perspective of collective action theory and given that 
participation in JOs is based on voluntarism and no institutional ‘coercion’ is present, 
the expectation would be that MSs would ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of other MSs. 
Despite there being sporadic occurrences of ‘free-riding’ behaviour, empirical data 
show that MSs do participate extensively in JOs. This raised the questions of 
motivations and patterns. Given the scale and importance that JOs at the Southern 
external borders have gained recently, the focus of the inquiry has been on JOs 
implemented at the Southern external borders. 
Hence, the paper set out to enquire what factor(s) can explain MSs’ participation in 
joint operations at the Southern external borders of the EU? In addition to this, as a 
secondary research puzzle, the paper looked into the question of what patterns of 
participation can be observed in joint operations at the Southern external borders of the 
EU?  
In order to shed light on the research questions, the thesis first explained the foundations 
of operational cooperation at EU level (subchapter 2.1, 2.2) and the pivotal role of JOs 
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in the framework of EU border management (subchapter 2.3). Thereafter, previous 
research was delineated to set the basis of the current study (subchapter 2.4). 
Subsequently, the research puzzle has been defined by using collective action theory 
(chapter 3) and hypothetical assumptions explaining motivations for MSs’ participation 
and potential patterns of participation were advanced (chapter 4). For the purpose of a 
sound research enquiry, the methodological approach and limitations were presented in 
the following (chapter 5). The findings of the in-depth analysis of the two selected cases 
of JOs, i.e. JO Hermes (Italy) (section 6.1) and JO Poseidon (Greece) (subchapter 6.2) 
were presented subsequently. For the purpose of clarity, the analysis was presented 
separately for the question on motivations (subchapters 6.1.1, 6.2.1) and for the question 
on patterns (subchapters 6.1.2, 6.2.2). A cross-case comparison has followed 
(subchapter 6.3). Finally, the conclusion sums up the findings and suggests potential 
avenues for further research (chapter 7). 
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2 Operational Cooperation at the 
External EU Border  
Guided by the premise that understanding “the politics of institutionalisation” (Leonard, 
2009: 372) is necessary to understand the intricacies and issues related to a policy, the 
following section will discuss the institutionalisation of operational cooperation and 
JOs, and the academic attention offered to this phenomenon.  
 
2.1 EU Border Management Policy: the foundation for 
operational cooperation 
30 years ago, in 1985, six European states met in a symbolically important place
2 
to sign 
the Schengen Agreement (1990), which envisaged the gradual abolition of checks at the 
common borders of the signatory states, and as a “functional spill-over” (Pollack, 2010: 
17ff.), the reinforcement of the newly formed external borders in consonance with a set 
of common rules. The “Schengen laboratory” (Commission, 2002: 2; Jorry, 2007: 3) 
constituted a first attempt at ensuring common external border control amongst a 
number of European states (see cf. Rijpma, 2009: 122; Mungianu, 2013: 360ff; 
Leonard, 2009: 377) and the agreement was subsequently adopted by most EU MSs
3
, 
including the Schengen Associated Countries (SACs). 
Given that the question of border control was and continues to be a topic of “high 
politics” that directly impinges on state sovereignty (Geddes, 2012: 266), the transfer of 
national powers to the First Pillar was “both partial and gradual” (Rijpma, 2009: 122), 
but gained significant legislative momentum with the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1999. The cautious conferral of powers to the supranational institutions in the 
area was eloquent of this development. Following the Tampere European Council of 
1999, a greater emphasis was set on the need for effective control of the external 
borders and, in view of this, the Council called for “closer cooperation and mutual 
                                                 
2
 The Schengen Agreement was signed in Schengen, Luxembourg, near the tri-point where the borders of 
France, Germany and Luxembourg meet.  
3
 The United Kingdom and Ireland have negotiated an opt-out from the Schengen acquis. Denmark also 
secured opt-outs in specific JHA areas but is a member of the Schengen Area. Also, the Schengen Area 
excludes Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus and, as of 2013, Croatia. The latter only hold Schengen 
candidate countries status. 
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technical assistance between the MSs’ border control services, such as exchange 
programmes and technology transfer, especially on maritime borders, and for the rapid 
inclusion of the applicant States in this co-operation” (European Council, 1999). 
In the context of the 9/11 terrorist attack and an increased influx of irregular migrants
4
 
coming from the African continent (Carrera, 2007), the question of border control was 
brought back on the EU agenda by the Laeken European Council of December 2001. 
The Laeken Council Conclusions reiterated the need for more effective control of the 
EU’s external borders that will “help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration 
networks and the traffic in human beings” (European Council, 2001). The European 
Council “ask[ed] the Council and the Commission to work out arrangements for 
cooperation between services responsible for external border control and to examine the 
conditions in which a mechanism or common services to control external borders could 
be created” (European Council, 2001: 12). The Laeken and Tampere Council were 
stepping stones towards the foundation of operational cooperation at the external 
borders of the EU, alluding to this necessity and possibility. 
In response to this, in 2002, the Commission issued a Communication “Towards 
Integrated Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the EU”, 
which delineated five mutually interdependent components to establish a common 
policy of management of the external borders, namely: “(a) a common corpus of 
legislation; (b) a common coordination and operational cooperation mechanism; (c) 
common integrated risk analysis; (d) staff trained in the European dimension and inter-
operational equipment; (e) burden-sharing between Member States in the run-up to a 
European Corps of Border Guards” (Commission, 2002: 12ff.). The Commission 
extensively emphasised the need for reinforcing operational burden-sharing and pooling 
financial, technical and human resources for the purpose of securing the external 
borders (Commission, 2002; Rijpma, 2009: 129). 
The subsequent “Action Plan for the Management of the External Borders” of the 
Council from June 2002 acknowledged the need for further cooperation but also 
maintained a reticent position related to the establishment of a European Corps of 
Border Guards and kept a “pragmatic orientation” (Rijpma, 2009: 128) regarding 
burden-sharing and common legislation (Council of the EU, 2002). Instead, the Council 
took steps towards the institutionalisation of operational cooperation by setting up a 
network structure consisting of specialised centres in different border management 
areas, under the coordination of a Common Unit (SCIFA+). Thus, at the outset, 
operational cooperation was established as “an expression of intergovernmental 
governance” and a method to “overcome the weaknesses of national management of the 
external borders” by acting collectively (Mungianu, 2013: 361). 
                                                 
4
 An irregular migrant is a “third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions 
of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or 
residence in the Member State concerned” (European Parliament, 2015). 
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However, this pragmatic institutionalisation soon revealed its deficits as the institutional 
set-up faced “structural limits” (Leonard, 2009: 378) and raised questions related to 
limitations in terms of membership and agenda, legal basis and effectiveness in 
operational matters (Commission, 2003; Rijpma, 2009: 131). This led to the 
replacement of SCIFA+ with the Practitioners’ Common Unit (PUC), composed only of 
the heads of border control services put in charge of operational issues. Soon after, a 
more structured approach to operational cooperation for the management of the external 
borders was advocated during the European Council in Thessaloniki. This offered the 
Commission a “window of opportunity” for proposing the establishment of the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders
5
 (Frontex). Despite the fact that, at the beginning, the Commission and the 
Parliament supported the creation of a European Corps of Border Guards, MSs opposed, 
which led to a compromise solution, namely the creation of Frontex to “promote 
burden-sharing, solidarity and mutual trust in the management of external borders” 
(Jorry, 2007: 2).  
2.2 The institutionalisation6 of operational cooperation  
A turning point in the development of operational cooperation has been the 
establishment of Frontex - the EU border management agency (Council Regulation 
2007/2004). Since 2005, Frontex became, alongside the MSs, a pivotal actor in border 
management, being tasked with the central responsibility of, inter alia
7
, “coordinat[ing] 
operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external 
borders” (Regulation 2007/2004, Article 2.1.a) and “fostering the principle of 
solidarity” in border management among MSs (Jorry, 2007: 1; Lusenti and Watanabe, 
2014: 3). However, perhaps not surprisingly given the reluctance of MSs to pool 
sovereignty in this field, “the responsibility for the control and surveillance of external 
borders [still] lies with the Member States”, while Frontex has only a coordination role 
(Regulation 2007/2004, Article 1.2).  
Hence, operational cooperation is the first of Frontex’s tasks and appears in the formal 
name of the agency. The most eloquent form of operational cooperation is represented 
by joint operations
8
. According to the Commission, JOs are “operational activities 
                                                 
5
 Hereinafter: Frontex. 
6
 Institutionalisation can be defined as embedding a set of procedures into one institution. 
7
 The other tasks of Frontex, as defined by the legal basis, are: to assist MSs in the training of national 
border guards and establish common training standards (Article 2.1.b), to carry out risk analyses (Article 
2.1.c), to follow up the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external 
borders (Article 2.1.d), to assist MSs with technical and operational assistance at the external borders 
(Article 2.1.e), and to provide MSs with necessary support in organizing joint return operations (Article 
2.1.f). 
8
 In addition to operational cooperation, the European Border Guard Teams, the RABIT teams and the 
European Border Fund also constitute forms of operational cooperation (see Mungianu, 2013). Given that 
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carried out by two or more MSs, and possibly in cooperation with the Agency, with a 
view to strengthen surveillance and control at a section of the external borders” 
(Commission, 2003a: 10). The importance of  JOs is substantiated also by the fact that 
more than 50% of the budget of Frontex is spent on such activities with the aim of 
curbing irregular migration and cross-border crime (Frontex, 2013a: 74; Frontex, 2012a: 
65; see also House of Lords, 2008: 3). This is by far the most important operational 
activity on which Frontex spends its budget and the one that received most scholarly 
attention. The types of JOs coordinated by Frontex in cooperation with MSs correspond 
to the three different types of borders that the EU MSs share with third countries, 
namely sea, land and air (Frontex, 2015b). Prior to the amendment of the Frontex 
Regulation in 2011, the original Frontex Regulation “contain[ed] no rules on how 
Frontex operations should be prepared, conducted and evaluated” (Commission, 2010: 
2), which raised questions in terms of legitimacy and accountability.  
The deployment of JOs was supported by a set of tools that have been developed with 
the purpose of facilitating operational cooperation. Up until the amendment of the 
Frontex Regulation in 2011, JOs relied on contributions from the MSs and SACs which 
were centralized in the Central Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE), a 
database of technical equipment for surveillance. However, contribution and 
participation to the JOs was entirely voluntary (Commission, 2003; 2010). The amended 
Regulation 2007/2004 established two other mechanisms to support operational 
cooperation, namely the European Border Guard Tools (EGBTs) and the Technical 
Equipment Pool (TEP). Despite the introduction of a more structured approach towards 
pooling resources for operational cooperation, participation and contribution of MSs are 
still made voluntarily based on the principle of solidarity and are negotiated on an 
annual basis with Frontex (Leonard, 2011: 245; Frontex, 2013b: 4).  
In addition to JOs, Frontex has also been mandated with the management of the rapid 
intervention mechanism (RABITs) which is to be activated in circumstances requiring 
extraordinary technical and operational assistance. In contrast to JOs, where 
contribution and participation are entirely voluntarily, RABITs are remarkable by the 
fact that they are founded on the principle of “compulsory solidarity” (Baldaccini, 2010: 
235; Leonard, 2011: 245). Thus, EU MSs are required to contribute to the “Rapid Pool” 
with border guards and deploy them upon request “unless they are faced with an 
exceptional situation substantially affecting the discharge of national tasks” (Regulation 
2007/2004). 
While touching upon different aspects of operational cooperation, the main focus of the 
present thesis will be joint operations and, in particular JOs at the Southern European 
Border. A motivation for this will follow. 
                                                                                                                                                        
JOs are developed through the deployment of RABIT or EGBTs, they constitute more likely tools that 
support operational cooperation and will be discussed as such in the present study.  
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2.3 Joint operations  
Due to their contentious nature
9
, scale and the rising death toll in the Mediterranean Sea, 
JOs at the Southern European border have gained prominence in recent years. Most JOs 
conducted there are joint sea operations, however, there are some more complex 
operational concepts that involve both sea and land operations. Nevertheless, joint sea 
operations are by far the most important operational activities conducted under the 
coordination of Frontex. Their importance in the context of EU border management is 
also reinforced by the fact that Frontex spends approximately 80% of the budget 
allocated for all JOs only on operations at sea (Frontex, 2013: 74; Frontex, 2012: 65; see 
also House of Lords, 2008: 3).   
At the Southern border level, Frontex coordinates a set of operational concepts (also 
called joint operations), which act as ‘umbrella’ operations that are activated in phases 
and in different years, most of which are joint sea operations. Thus, from 2006, Frontex 
coordinated inter alia the different phases of a number of overarching JO concepts in 
cooperation with the three main ‘gate-keepers’ of the EU’s borders, namely: Hera, 
Indalo, Minerva (hosted by Spain), Nautilus (hosted by Italy and Malta), Hermes, 
Aeneas, Triton (hosted by Italy), Poseidon Sea and Land (hosted by Greece). All were 
deployed in operational areas along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea or at the land 
external borders, with the exception of Hera, which took place in the Atlantic Ocean 
(Frontex, 2010a; Frontex, 2015b).  
The JOs’ are strategically deployed to cover the main migration corridors on sea 
namely: from Turkey to Greece, migration occurring both by sea and land (the Eastern 
Mediterranean route), from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and Malta (the Central 
Mediterranean route), and from Morocco to Spain by sea, as well as to the Spanish 
enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla (both by land and sea) (the Western Mediterranean route) 
(Frontex, 2015a). As illustrated in Figure 1, these are the main “hotspots” where 
detections of illegal border-crossings occurred, which in recent years have been put 
under pressure due to higher levels of migratory flows. However, contrary to popular 
belief, migration by sea constitutes only a small fraction of the overall phenomenon of 
migration. In fact, the majority of irregular immigrants arrive legally in the EU (mainly 
by air) but then they overstay their visa (Frontex, 2015b, Wolff, 2008). 
  
                                                 
9
 See Baldaccini (2010) for a discussion on extraterritorial border control through Frontex sea operations. 
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Figure 1: Detections of illegal border-crossing by migratory corridor (2009-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s design based on data from Frontex Annual Risk Analysis (2015a: 16)10 
Frontex-coordinated JOs are thoroughly planned and “intelligence-driven” (Frontex, 
2015b) and the modus operandi of JOs follows a pre-defined operational cycle. In the 
initial phase, an operational plan (which is not publically available) is drafted for each 
JO in agreement principally with the “host state”11 and with the cooperation of the 
participating MSs. Each JO is normally managed from an International Coordination 
Centre (ICC) located in the ‘host state’, where representatives of Frontex and of the 
MSs involved in the JO with human or operational resources are located (House of 
Lords, 2008: 32). Once the operation commences, actions undertaken with the 
equipment and experts belonging to another state must be agreed upon with a 
representative of the state to which they belong. Since the establishment of Frontex in 
2005, the number of JOs coordinated by the agency has increased considerably. 
Furthermore, interestingly enough, more and more MSs are participating in JOs despite 
the voluntary nature of participation (see Frontex, 2011b: 13, Marin, 2011).  
From a legal point of view, JOs may involve all MSs, with the exception of the UK and 
Ireland, which have negotiated an opt-out from the implementation of the Schengen 
rules. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the UK is not associated in the 
Schengen/Dublin system, it has been participating in JOs conducted by Frontex (House 
of Lords, 2008). In addition to these, SACs that have decided to sign association 
agreements to the Schengen/Dublin System may also take part in the operational 
activities. Furthermore, increased operational cooperation has extended also beyond the 
                                                 
10
 Data prior to 2009 was not available. The figures presented in the graph show an incomplete picture as 
they do not include those that eluded the border controls and entered the EU.  
11
 A ‘host state’ is defined as a MS in which a joint operation, a pilot project or a rapid intervention takes 
place or from which it is launched (Regulation 2007/2004). A ‘home state’ is the state seconding border 
guards and providing assets for a joint operation. 
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EU, as it involved at times the participation of third countries in JOs coordinated by 
Frontex. This has led to prolonged debates in the academia over the 
‘extraterritorialisation’ of border control (see Baldaccini, 2010, Andrade, 2010, Marin, 
2011). Despite this being an intriguing phenomenon, the extent of this study precludes a 
more thorough discussion. 
Furthermore, in recent years, with the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as 
a legally binding document, but also due to violations of human rights (HR), such as 
allegations of refoulement
12
 (i.e. ‘push-backs’), inhumane living conditions in the 
reception and detention centres, as well as the death of thousands of immigrants at the 
“door-steps” of the EU (Baldaccini, 2010), JOs have also been tightly interlinked with 
respect for HR and have received a “humanitarian” dimension due to the development 
of search and rescue (SAR) actions during joint sea operations. Additionally, in respect 
to HR, in 2011, Frontex adopted a Fundamental Rights Strategy, which has the aim of 
embedding respect for HR in all its activities including JOs. JOs, and in particular joint 
sea operations have recently become a focal point of discussion in the EU and the need 
for their reinforcement (in particular of JO Triton and JO Poseidon) has been proposed 
in the 10 Point Action Plan, recently endorsed by the European Council in an 
Extraordinary Meeting on Migration (European Council, 2015). 
2.4 Previous research related to operational cooperation  
Despite the great political and media attention that operational cooperation and, in 
particular JOs, have attracted and their importance at EU level, little academic attention 
has been given to the topic. Furthermore, the academic literature on the topic written 
thus far has focused on offering mostly descriptive empirical accounts of the 
development of operational cooperation and JOs and focused primarily on the role of 
Frontex (see e.g. Mungianu, 2013; Jorry, 2007; Pollak and Slominski, 2009; Wolff, 
2008; Andrade, 2010; Baldacchini, 2010; Leonard, 2011; Marin, 2011; Bolanin and 
Bellais, 2014).  
A common line of argumentation that is recurrent in the literature is connected to the 
question of effective and efficient contribution of MSs to the development of JOs, 
which was signalled in various academic articles (Mungianu 2013; Jorry, 2007; Pollak 
and Slominski, 2009; Haake, 2012; Wolff, 2008; Bolanin and Bellais, 2014; Haake et 
al., 2012). However, past the empirical accounts, the phenomenon of JOs has not been 
discussed as yet from a theoretically grounded point of view. Thus, this study aims to 
fill this gap in knowledge and analyse participation in JOs from a theoretically grounded 
point of view, and thereby also complementing the scarce empirical knowledge existent 
in the literature on JOs.   
                                                 
12
 Refoulement entails the forced return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to 
be subjected to ill-treatment or persecution. 
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3 Collective action through operational 
cooperation  
Collective action normally occurs when the action of two or more actors is necessary to 
accomplish an outcome (Udehn, 1993: 240; Sandler, 1992: 1). Thus, by definition 
operational cooperation and JOs are forms of collective action that are deployed with 
the purpose prima facie of sharing the burden of border management of the external EU 
borders. Furthermore, due to their specific nature, similar to CSDP operations (but on a 
much smaller scale), JOs are ‘collective actions’ which require political, economic, 
logistic and human resources, and, as such, represent a ‘burden’ that has to be shared by 
the participating states (Nováky, 2011: 3). 
The theory of collective action has its roots in the reasoning of Mancur Olson (1970) 
who refuted the traditional assumption that “groups of individuals with common 
interests are expected to act on behalf of their common interests much as single 
individuals act on behalf of their personal interests” (Olson, 1970: 1). Instead, he 
purported that “members of a large group […] will not act to advance their common or 
group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or […] some separate 
incentives” (Olson, 1970: 2). This is in stark contrast to previous research that assumed 
that collectives having similar goals will be inclined to act collectively for the 
attainment of those goals. Sandler (1992: 3) concisely grasps the pivotal argument of 
Olson, namely that “individual rationality is not sufficient for collective rationality”. 
However, individual rationality also entails that actors will take the most rational course 
of action, especially if not coerced, and ‘free-ride’ (i.e. they will enjoy the benefits of 
the collective goods without contributing to the actual costs for providing that good) 
(Olson, 1970; Sandler 1992). Space limitations preclude the author from ‘doing justice’ 
to the 50 years of research regarding collective action. However, for the purpose of this 
study, this is assessed as not being necessary, given that collective action theory will be 
used as a ‘heuristic device’ in setting the basis of the research puzzle and not as an 
‘explanatory law’ (Udehn, 1993: 240). This follows the reasoning lines of Bossong and 
Rhinard (2012: 133) who argued that “part of the beauty of the public goods approach is 
that it can be used productively at various levels of sophistication”.  
Going back to the assumptions afore-delineated raises an initial question: what kind of 
‘outcome’ are MSs collectively acting for through JOs as means of border management?  
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3.1 Security: as a “Janus-faced” collective good 
Coastguards have a crucial role of both saving lives and securing maritime borders. 
(Commission, 2015: 11) 
In the literature, collective action is connected with the provision of ‘collective goods’. 
According to the theory, ‘collective goods’ are produced in the common interest of a 
group through the aggregation of individual contributions (Thielemann and Armstrong, 
2013: 155). This raises the question, what type of interest do MSs’ share which gives 
rise to JOs and what is/are the collective good(s) sought and generated through border 
management via JOs? 
Traditionally, security was the main raison d’être of a state and was tightly interlinked 
with the concept of borders. The borders constituted the virtual boundary between the 
inside and the outside and were the “mark of sovereignty” (Bolanin and Bellais, 2014: 
232ff.). The abolition of internal borders and the establishment of free movement within 
the EU made the remaining ‘virtual’ borders porous. This, coupled with the 
intensification of transnational threats gave rise to an ever-expanding discourse on the 
‘securitization’ of migration and its perception as a ‘threat’ to the internal stability and 
integrity of a state. Consequently, border management tools (inter alia JOs) have been 
put in place with the primary goal of mitigating this ‘threat’ and ensuring security 
(Ceccorulli, 2009; Marin, 2012; Leonard, 2011). Following this reasoning, it becomes 
apparent that, prima facie, security is the main ‘collective good’ sought and (arguably) 
generated through JOs. However, different types of security can be connected to JOs at 
the external borders, i.e. at ‘intermediate’ level - border security, and at ‘finite’ level - 
internal security, which essentially relies on border security. Given that border security 
and internal security have similar implications, they can both be defined by using a 
broader definition of security. Leonard (2011: 238) interprets security as involving a 
‘continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and to existential threat’. 
According to the public goods theory, collective goods are considered to have two 
essential characteristics, namely: non-excludability, i.e. non-contributors cannot be 
precluded from benefiting from the produced good, and respectively non-rivalry, i.e. 
one actor’s use of the good does not affect the benefits available to the others (Sandler, 
1992: 6; Bossong and Rhinard, 2013: 134). Previous research shows that both border 
security and internal security can be substantiated as ‘collective goods’ (see Bolanin and 
Bellais, 2014; Bossong and Rhinard, 2013). Thus, benefits from border security 
provided through the efforts of one MS or a group of MSs necessarily extend to the 
other MSs of the Schengen system (i.e. they are non-excludable), and benefits enjoyed 
by any one of the MSs do not decrease the level of benefits available to the other MSs 
(i.e. they are non-rival). Furthermore, the provision of internal security in the EU by 
ensuring control over the borders can be equally enjoyed by all states, and the benefits 
drawn by one MS from internal security do not diminish the benefits of the others.  
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In the context of increased attention given to HR in connection to JOs, a question that 
arises is whether other types of ‘collective goods’ are generated indirectly. In a study 
regarding burden-sharing in refugee protection Suhrke (1998) (see Thielemann, 2010) 
argued that refugee protection has important ‘collective good’ characteristics as all 
countries profit if some countries provide refuge to displaced persons. Suhrke argues 
that the protection of refugees reduces the risk of conflict and ensures security for all 
states, which makes it in principle a non-excludable and non-rival collective good (see 
also Thielemann, 2010). Similarly, given that a significant part of migrants attempting 
to cross the borders are refugees and asylum seekers, it can be argued that refugee 
protection (‘human security’) is provided via JOs (especially joint sea operations, which 
many times turn into SAR actions), which can have collective good characteristics. 
Nonetheless, critics would contradict this view by arguing that collective action via JOs 
has been actually generating insecurity for the migrants due to ‘push-back’ practices 
(Carrera and Den Hertog, 2015). This essentially leads us to the question ‘security for 
whom?’ (Baldwin, 1977) and makes security in connection to JOs a ‘Janus-faced’ and 
elusive collective good.  
3.2 Collective action problem: Free-riding problem...or 
not? 
Departing from the theoretical assumption that “members of a large group […] will not 
act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them 
to do so, or […] some separate incentives” (Olson, 1970: 2) and taking into 
consideration that participation of MSs in JOs is entirely voluntary, ‘free-riding’ 
behaviour should be the norm (hypothetically speaking). ‘Free-riding’ behaviour has 
been loosely defined in the literature; however, the ‘free-rider’ problem has been 
generally used to refer to a situation in which an actor benefits from the consumption of 
a collective good (e.g. border security and internal security), while they “free-ride” (i.e. 
not participate) (Sandler, 1992: 17). Thus, despite the fact that MSs share a collective 
interest in the provision of border security and internal security, the absence of coercion 
and the nature of the goods provided could potentially lead some MSs to free-ride on 
the efforts of the others to secure the borders and not take part in JOs. 
Traditional public goods approaches put an emphasis on the fact that individual 
contributions to the production of some collective goods are normally both costly and 
often “only trivially important in achieving a group goal, especially in large groups” 
(Shepsle, 2005: 8). Given that “non-contribution is a dominant strategy in the collective 
action game”, it may be assumed that MSs will be tempted to ‘free-ride’ (Shepsle, 2005: 
8; Udhen, 1993: 239). Furthermore, due to their non-excludable and non-rival nature, 
collective goods are assumed to ‘encourage free-riding’ (Bolanin and Bellais, 2014: 
234). 
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However, despite there being occurrences which could be perceived as ‘free-riding’ 
behaviour, an overall empirical analysis of MSs’ participation in JOs points out that 
‘free-riding’ is not that common and that MSs do participate in JOs (see Frontex, 
2011b) despite there being no ‘institutional coercion’ (understood as legally binding 
provisions). This argument is also reinforced by looking more generally at contributions 
of MSs to the main operational resources for Frontex-coordinated JOs, currently the 
European Border Guard Teams (EGBTs) and the Technical Equipment Pool (TEP). 
Since their establishment in 2011, Frontex compiled annual reports regarding the 
commitments made by MSs to the EBGTs pool. According to the Frontex reports, the 
number of EGBTs committed increased from 1.875 at the end of 2013 (Frontex, 2013b: 
7) to 2.500 at the end of 2014 (Frontex, 2014b: 9). Furthermore, the reports also show 
an increase in the number of contributions to the TEP. To give just a few examples, for 
instance, the number of offshore patrol vessels increased from 17 in 2013 to 26 in 2014, 
whereas the number of coast patrol boats increased from 137 to 196 (see Frontex 2013b, 
2014b). It must be emphasised that contributions to both the EGBTs and the TEPs are 
done based on “Calls for contributions” and “Calls for secondment”, and as such depend 
on MSs’ willingness (see Frontex 2013b, 2014b). 
This raises both a theoretical and empirical puzzle if perceived from the perspective of 
collective action theory, which assumes that, despite having a common interest, 
members of a large group will not contribute unless coerced or unless some “separate 
incentives” exist. As afore-delineated, the overall institutional set-up for JOs does not 
imply the existence of ‘institutional coercion’, which may account for MSs’ 
participation in JOs. This raises at least two questions, can there be other types of 
‘coercion’, ‘constraints’ or ‘selective incentives’ in connection to participation in JOs 
that may account for MSs’ participation? What types of ‘incentives’ or ‘constraints’ are 
present that could potentially impact the decision of MSs to participate? These two 
questions will be tackled in Chapter 4, which will propose two hypothetical assumptions 
and argue why they have the potential to explain participation. Furthermore, in parallel, 
the paper will attempt to gain an insight of potential patterns of participation, but this 
will constitute a secondary research question as highlighted in the following subchapter.   
3.3 Problem definition and aim of the study 
Public policy tools, and implicitly JOs, are formulated and implemented in multi-actor 
networks (Hermans et al., 2014: 10). In this sense, Noll (2003: 237) purported that, in 
asylum policy, burden-sharing (participation) in collective action efforts can be seen as 
a “multi-actor, multi-level game bringing together states, sub-state entities and 
protection seekers”. However, the network approach is hampered by a truly 
“Babylonian conceptual chaos” (Borzel in Sabatier, 2007: 129) as it involves a myriad 
of actors having converging and/or diverging interests.  
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Along these lines of thinking, EU JOs as forms of collective action have been developed 
in multi-actor settings with the purpose of securing the ‘collective goods’ of border 
security and, ultimately, internal security. However, despite sharing (a) common 
goal(s), according to the collective action theory, and as afore-explained, MSs are 
expected to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others. Given that no real ‘institutional coercion’ 
exists in this equation and participation is based on voluntarism, the expectation that 
states will ‘free-ride’ is even higher. Nevertheless, empirical data shows that MSs do 
participate in JOs. This raises the question of motivations or rationales for the 
participation of MSs. Given the scope of the present paper, the focus has been placed 
mainly on JOs developed at the Southern external borders which led to the question: 
What factor(s) can explain MSs’ participation13 in joint operations at the Southern 
external borders of the European Union?  
Despite the inherent flaws in arguing that MSs’ preferences are “homogenous and 
interchangeable” (Udehn, 1993: 243), for the purpose of simplification, the present 
paper assumed that MSs share common preferences, although adjacently a more 
nuanced inquiry has been sought where the data permitted it. Moreover, the ‘puzzle’ 
also raised the question of patterns (understood as trends): what type of patterns of 
participation in joint operations can be observed? However, this was explored only as a 
secondary question and at an aggregate level and provided an indication of general 
trends, but the paper has not delved deeper into the rationales behind these trends and 
patterns.  
The analysis was hypothetico-deductive and drew on existent literature to propose a set 
of premises formulated theoretically. This is due to the scope of the study, which 
precluded a more thorough analysis of this puzzle. The overall purpose of the study is 
explanatory (Yin, 2009: 7, 40), seeking to scrutinise motivations for MSs’ participation 
in JOs and to explore the question of patterns.  
 
                                                 
13
 Other than host states for the JOs. 
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4 Opening ‘Pandora’s box’: Premises 
regarding motivations and patterns of MSs’ 
participation 
There is a human proclivity to draw stark distinctions and to represent complex reality 
with a simple characterisation (Sandler, 2004: 11). 
When asking what might motivate the EU MSs to participate in collective action 
through JOs in a voluntary manner, some might immediately utter the word ‘solidarity’. 
Solidarity is a guiding EU principle encapsulated in the EU primary law through the 
‘Solidarity clause’ (see Article 222 TFEU). In connection to border management and 
migration policies of the EU, ‘solidarity’ is portrayed as a ‘beam of light’ that should 
guide the actions of MSs, given that “[t]he policies of the Union in border management, 
asylum and immigration and their implementation should be governed by the principle 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the Member States pursuant to 
Article 80
14
 of the TFEU” (Regulation 656/2014, Recital 2). The term ‘solidarity’ is an 
ambiguous and “thick concept” (Coppedge, 1999) and a precise definition is hard to 
find. However, EU solidarity has been mostly associated with the principle of 
universalization, i.e. acting as one wishes the others to act (Thielemann, 2003) and 
defined as ‘loyal cooperation’ (Mitsilegas, 2014: 187). Despite the importance of 
solidarity in the EU set-up, this paper seeks to look “beyond the much-vaunted 
solidarity” (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 355) in order to find other rationales that 
might motivate MSs to participate, while acknowledging that solidarity may play an 
important role.  
In the literature, two paradigms for explaining state action have been substantiated. 
March and Olsen (1989) argued that two logics are at the foundation of individual 
(state) action, namely: a logic of consequence and a logic of appropriateness. While the 
logic of consequence is informed by rational-choice assumptions and cost-benefit 
calculations, the logic of appropriateness is informed by notions of identity, norms and 
rules (March & Olsen, 1989: 949ff; see cf. Goldmann, 2005; Thielemann, 2003; Opp, 
2012).  
                                                 
14
 Article 80 TFEU states that: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation 
shall be governed by the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial 
implications, between the Member States”. The policies of the Union under the chapter are: policies on 
border checks, asylum and immigration (Chapter 2 TFEU). 
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From a broad perspective, previous attempts to explain state participation and patterns 
of participation in different forms of collective action or in burden-sharing schemes 
have been made by scholars, mainly in connection to asylum and refugee policy 
(Thielemann, 2003; Thielemann and Armstrong, 2013; Thielemann and El-Enany, 
2010; Thielemann and Dewan, 2006) or common security and defence policy (Nováky, 
2011). However, given the paucity of information related to Frontex-coordinated JOs, 
no attempt has been made to investigate the intricacies of state participation in them.  
Relying on these theoretical concepts and literature, the following sections will attempt 
to provide two potential premises for participation and two potential hypotheses of 
participation patterns of states in JOs. However, when trying to explore these aspects 
one must take into account the sui generis nature of JOs and, in particular, the nature of 
joint sea operations. In this sense, Leonard (2011: 240ff.) highlights the particular 
nature of joint sea operations by calling them “extraordinary in the broadest sense of the 
word, i.e. out of the ordinary”, due to the involvement of “semi-militarised” actors in 
them
15
 and their security-oriented character (Marin, 2011; Lutterbeck, 2006). This is 
also valid to a certain extent for joint land operations.  
Taking these aspects into consideration, as well as the afore-delineated assumptions 
about MSs’ interests, the following sections will argue that participation in JOs can be 
seen both from the perspective of the logic of consequence and of the logic of 
appropriateness. The afore-mentioned research questions can be approached from 
numerous perspectives and a vast spectrum of explanatory factors can be taken into 
consideration, which “will function as an unlimited reservoir, of potential, or ad hoc 
explanations” (Udhen, 1993: 248) and provide “an extremely inelegant ‘saturated’ 
model that explains each outcome perfectly” (Coppedge, 1999: 467). While trading 
saturation for parsimony, the following explanations will gravitate around a small set of 
potential explanatory factors.  
4.1 Logic of anticipated consequences 
The logic of consequence assumes that actors are rational (in the present case, states) 
and perceives action as “driven by the logic of rational and strategic behaviour that 
anticipates consequences and is based on given preferences” (Thielemann, 2003: 255; 
see also March and Olsen, 1989; 9; Pollack, 2010: 24-25; Gillinson, 2004). This is in 
line with the rational choice approach which explains both “individual and collective 
(social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints” (Pollack, 2007: 
32; Snidal, 2013: 87). The rational choice approach assumes the existence of three 
elements: (a) methodological individualism, (b) goal-seeking or utility maximization, 
and (c) the existence of institutional or strategic constraints on individual choice. In this 
                                                 
15
 For example, the joint sea operations are coordinated by the Guardia Civil in Spain, respectively 
Guardia di Finanza, both having semi-military status (Lutterbeck, 2006). 
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context, individuals (states) are assumed to act according to preferences which are 
“fixed, transitive and exogenously given” (Pollack, 2007: 32ff.). This essentially means 
that actors’ preferences and actions are constrained and the constraints may arise either 
from the existence of institutions or from actors’ interdependencies (Snidal, 2013: 87).  
At its core, the Schengen area is built upon interdependencies, as control of the external 
borders has become a matter of co-responsibility. This means that a MS’s control of its 
section of the external border is done on behalf of the whole EU and a border MS “acts 
in the interest of the other MSs” (European Commission, 2011b). This naturally implies 
security interdependencies between actors (Sandler, 1992: 1), as the states with weak 
control systems will not only attract migrants themselves, but also be used as transit 
routes towards other regions. Ultimately, this entails that “the system is only as strong 
as its weakest link, with a single weakness in any part of it having potential serious 
implications for all other parts” (Ceccorulli, 2009: 4). Ever since the 1990’s, migration 
has been perceived in the EU as presenting inherent vulnerabilities, given that migratory 
flows of labour migrants, irregular migrants and asylum-seekers were associated with 
various ‘threats’, such as terrorism, cross-border crime or social unrest (Leonard, 2011). 
Thus, a discourse on the ‘securitisation’ of migration and its perception as a ‘threat’ to 
internal stability and security flourished (Ceccorulli, 2009). Consequently, border 
management through JOs became, inter alia, one of the primary tools for mitigating this 
‘threat’ for the purpose of safeguarding the ‘collective goods’ (i.e. border and internal 
security). Hence, security interdependencies and the “securitisation” of migration led to 
policy coordination, which essentially altered actors’ preferences and interests.  
Nonetheless, the presence of the risk can be perceived as pervasive due to the existence 
of an area with no internal borders between Schengen States, which means that 
clandestine migration bound for certain Southern states is an issue of common concern 
for all the EU (Andrade, 2010: 313). As Ceccorulli (2009: 15) notes, “while differing 
over detail, all MSs have a common interest in a strong external border”. This is due to 
the fact that the free-movement of people principle facilitates the movement of both 
bona fide travellers but also of irregular migrants and potential criminals. Furthermore, 
numerous scholars show that most migrants travel to other European countries once 
entered in the EU (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 40, 45; Brian and Laczo, 2014: 
86). Thus, while it is evident that border countries are the most exposed to the risk of 
irregular migration and the vulnerabilities it brings for internal security, and as such are 
interested in securing the borders by participating in JOs, it may be assumed that the 
other MSs have an equal interest in securing the borders and participating. 
This line of reasoning allows us to assume that migration acted homogenously as a form 
of ‘exogenous constraint’ over the preferences of MSs in participating in collective 
action at the external EU borders. From this perspective, and given that “rational choice 
has explained change in terms of changing constraints” (Snidal, 2013: 100), it may be 
assumed that an increase or decrease in participation in JOs could be correlated with an 
increase or decrease in the perception of the migration ‘threat’ at a certain point in time. 
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In a similar vein, when attempting to explain participation in burden-sharing schemes 
for asylum, Thielemann (2003: 255-256) argued that participation can be perceived as a 
measure taken for “insurance against the occurrence of a particular external shock”. 
This essentially provides us with a premise for a potential motivation for participation, 
namely that, provided the ‘securitisation’ of migration and its perception as a ‘threat’ at 
the EU level, the presence of a security ‘threat’ (i.e. high irregular migration flow) has 
the potential to affect MS’s willingness to participate in JOs (security-driven 
motivation) as they will feel a direct concern over their own internal security.  
However, this line of argumentation is not sensitive to the fact that MSs do not share the 
same exposure to the migration ‘threat’. MSs face different situations due to their 
geographical location and patterns of travel flows and migratory routes (Commission, 
2011c) and provided that “threats travel more easily over short distances than over long 
ones” (Ceccorulli, 2009: 4), this would make the states in the immediate vicinity of the 
external borders and their neighbours more vulnerable to migratory flows. Furthermore, 
although there are inherent differences between defence threats and migration ‘threats’, 
some scholars argue that there are also some similarities (Marin, 2011; Lutterbeck, 
2006). From the theoretical standpoint of burden-sharing and participation in military 
operations, a country’s willingness to assume the burden associated with collective 
security is directly proportional to its perception of threat (Nováky, 2011). Thus, a more 
realistic line of argumentation is that the ‘threat’ exposure is not equally shared by MSs 
and that one can speak about a “variable ‘threat’ exposure” (Bossong and Rhinard, 
2013). Following these lines of reasoning, we can formulate a premise for patterns of 
participation as it may be assumed that countries closer to the Southern external 
borders, for which the perception of the ‘threat’ is (supposedly) higher, will be more 
likely to participate.   
4.2 Logic of appropriateness  
The assumption that political action is solely governed by a logic of consequences has 
been contested by numerous scholars (March and Olsen, 1998; Udehn, 1993; 
Thielemann, 2003; Opp, 2012) who argued that such a view does not consider the role 
of ‘non-material’ incentives (Opp, 2012: 77). Thus, scholars argued that alternative 
catalysts for action can be viewed from the perspective of the logic of appropriateness. 
Rational choice critics, in particular, emphasised the complexity of individual choice 
and the “inevitability of deliberation, of moral conflict, and moral purpose” (Hurrell and 
Macdonald, 2012: 71). Thus, the logic of appropriateness purports that actors seek to 
fulfil obligations which are embedded in a set of norms to which they adhere or which 
are subject to a collective identity (March and Olsen, 2009). As such, actors are seen as 
“acting in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed and publicly 
known, anticipated and accepted” (March and Olsen, 1989: 949-952). On the other 
hand, more balanced approaches argued that the logic of consequence is interlinked 
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with that of appropriateness, as self-interest can be defined to include altruism, 
commitment to norms, feelings of solidarity (see Udhen, 1993; Opp, 2012).  
In this approach, actors are expected to act in accordance with a set of norms which 
constrain and guide their behaviour. Norms are understood as “internalised Kantian 
imperatives (“blind, compulsive, mechanical or even unconscious”)” which carry a 
sense of obligation and constrain individual behaviour (Hurell and Macdonald, 2013: 
71). As such, the constraint is generated endogenously and spurs from non-utilitarian 
factors such as obligations, habits and practices. However, Väyrynen (1999: 36ff.) 
argued that norm commitment can be enforced both endogenously and exogenously. 
Endogenous enforcement of commitment to a norm entails the fact constraints arise 
from a normative perspective due to the internalisation of norms and values by the 
actor. On the other hand, exogenous enforcement of commitment to a norm arises when 
the constraint is externally imposed on the actor, through coercive or non-coercive 
measures.   
Analysing more broadly the literature on migration and asylum policy, as well as the 
one on operational cooperation, one ‘norm’ appears prominently, i.e. respect for human 
rights (Thielemann, 2003; Thielemann and Dewan, 2006). Departing from the 
assumptions that “good explanations are made lean and minimize the assumptions 
made” (Snidal, 2013: 89), the paper will focus on the importance of HR in the context 
of JOs. This is due to the relevance that HR have gained regarding JOs over time.  
The norm of upholding human rights has been considered as one of the constitutive 
norms of the EU (Manners, 2006: 70ff.). The axiomatic importance of HR is also 
embedded in the legal basis of the EU, as the Treaty of Lisbon states that “The Union is 
founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for HR, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
These values are common to the Member States […]” (Article 2 TFEU). Although 
embedded in the operational activities from the beginning, the importance of HR has 
caught momentum in more recent years, due to the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (2009) as a legally binding document, but also due to violations of 
HR, such as allegations of refoulement (i.e. ‘push-backs’), inhumane living conditions 
in the reception and detention centres, as well as the death of thousands of migrants at 
the ‘door-steps’ of the EU (Baldaccini, 2010).  
The recent declaration of the High Representative Federica Mogherini, in relation to the 
incidents in the Mediterranean highlights the importance of HR in the context of 
European action: “The Mediterranean is our sea, one of our seas, and we have to act 
together as Europeans. It is not only an issue of moral duty: the numbers of people that 
are dying at sea, not only the day before yesterday but over the last months and years, 
tell us we cannot repeat again "never again" if we don't act consistently and coherently 
afterwards. It is also our interest, our credibility. The European Union was built and is 
built around the protection of human rights, human dignity and the life of human 
people. We need to be consistent in that; this is also our specific interest” [emphasis 
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added] (Mogherini, 2015). However, viewed from the theoretical framework of 
Väyrynen (1999), this statement points to an ambivalent position as it connects 
commitment to safeguarding human rights both to a “moral duty” and to “specific 
interests”.  
This line of argumentation leads us to one broad assumption regarding motivations to 
participate, as it can be assumed that the occurrence of human rights violations may act 
as a factor determining MSs to participate in JOs (norm-driven motivation).  This is 
provided the fact that JOs do protect HR. However, viewed in the framework of 
Väyrynen (1999) concern over the occurrence of violations of HR may be motivated 
either by endogenous enforced commitment to the norm of HR (“moral duty” to act 
imposed by the actors upon themselves), or can be exogenous constrained commitment 
to the norm of HR (“interest to act” imposed by external actors). Given the difficulty in 
making a clear-cut differentiation or finding actual significant data that may support the 
idea that commitment to a norm was constrained either endogenously or exogenously, 
the paper will primarily seek a causal connection between the occurrence of HR 
violations and participation in JOs and will only minimally look into whether this comes 
from exogenous/endogenous enforced norm commitment.  
When assessing patterns of participation from a norm-based perspective, it can be noted 
that MSs differ widely in their adherence to EU values and norms and in particular to 
commitment to HR (WJP, 2015). While some states are “front-runners” in promoting 
commitment and respect for HR, others can be considered “laggards”. Given that 
problems related to the respect for HR appear to be pervasive when it comes to JOs, and 
under the premise that MSs’ degree of commitment to HR varies widely, it can be 
assumed that countries that are more committed to human rights are more likely to 
participate in JOs.  
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5 Methodological considerations  
The following sections will present the research design and the core methodological 
tools utilised. Given that any research design and method is fallible, this section will 
also highlight the strengths and limitations of the methodological choices made.  
5.1 “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants”16: Combining 
insights from multiple theories 
The present paper departed from the theory of collective action, which constituted a key 
basis for problematizing the research inquiry. As observed by various scholars, the 
strengths of the collective action lie not only in its ‘hard’ mathematical uses, but also in 
the fact that they can provide structure and rigour to the assessment of complex policy 
phenomena and pinpoint analytical puzzles (Sperling, 2012: 203ff; see also Pecorino, 
2014; Hermans et al. 2014: 10ff). As such, the present paper used collective action 
theory only as a “heuristic device” and not an “explanatory law” (Udehn, 1993: 240). In  
order to advance premises for motivations and patterns of participation, the study 
departed from the two logics of action developed by March and Olsen, but 
complemented them with literature explaining state action and participation in burden-
sharing. Using a “complementary approach” to theory and combining insights from 
multiple theories can help uncover new perspectives and “prompt us to seek evidence 
that we would not otherwise uncover” (Cairney, 2013: 8). Moreover, “[…] explicit or 
implicit ‘conceptual lenses’ and the promotion of multiple lenses should allow us to 
become more aware of the assumptions that underpin each lens […]” (Cairney, 2013: 
8). Thus, the present paper did not seek an ad litteram application of the theory, as 
theory was used to formulate potential explanations and hypotheses for the research 
inquiry. 
  
                                                 
16
 Cairney, 2013: 1. 
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5.2 Methodological approach 
For the purpose of explaining the research questions, the case study method and the 
method of structured-focused comparison were utilised. Additionally, the study 
combined qualitative and quantitative methods.  
5.2.1 Case study method and Structured-focused comparison 
For the purpose of shedding light on the research questions, the present study employed 
the method of case study which entails “the detailed examination of an aspect of a 
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to 
other events” (George and Bennett, 2005: 5; cf. also Gerring, 2004: 141; Crasnow, 
2011: 28). Although being criticised for lacking “scientific consciousness” (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 68), the case study method has the advantage of “allow(ing) one to peer 
into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural 
cause and its purported effect” (Gerring, 2007: 45). Thus, in-depth analysis of JOs shed 
light on the potential rationales for participation and pinpointed potential patterns. 
Additionally, case studies have the advantage of being able to serve heuristic purposes 
and inductively identify other important causal mechanisms, as such setting the basis for 
future research (George and Bennett, 2005: 45). Given that this is a first attempt at 
explaining participation in JOs, while following a structured approach to the analysis of 
the cases, the researcher has taken into consideration other potential explanatory factors.  
As presented in the following, the study has analysed two cases. For the purpose of 
providing an answer to the first research question, qualitative within-case analysis 
through process-tracing has been employed. This has not only provided an answer to the 
research question but also fed into the analysis of the second research question, which 
has been explored primarily quantitatively. In order to compare the cases, the method of 
structured-focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005: 67ff) has been used. In this 
sense, the formulation of the explanatory premises both for the question on motivations, 
as well as the one on patterns, gravitate around a small set of premises which give 
structure and focus to the case analysis. This has also ensured that cross-case analysis 
could be effectively performed as the same types of underlying factors have been 
investigated in both cases.  
5.2.2 Case selection 
A “case” is construed by George and Bennett (2005: 17) as “an instance of a class of 
events”. The concept of “class of events” is defined by scholars as a “phenomenon of 
scientific interest” (George and Bennett, 2005: 17). The research questions identified for 
a study guide the research and facilitate the identification and definition of the “unit of 
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analysis (i.e. “case(s)”)” (Yin, 2009: 30). In the present case, the research question 
circumscribes the ambit of the “class of events” to JOs at the external Southern borders 
of the EU. While data availability was axiomatic in selecting the cases, methodological 
criteria and reasoning have been applied to avoid selection bias (King et al., 1994: 
128ff.), but also to ensure the comparability of the cases by selecting “comparable 
cases” on “key variables” (Lijphart, 1971: 687ff.). As the paper utilises both qualitative 
and quantitative methods, but the qualitative method is predominant, the study has 
utilised purposive sampling for the selection of the cases. However, the selection of 
cases when using mixed methods can lead to what is called a “representativeness/ 
saturation trade-off”, which entails the fact that emphasis is set either on the saturation 
of the qualitative sample or more emphasis is placed on the representativeness of the 
quantitative sample (Teddlie and Yu, 2007: 83-87). Nevertheless, given that the 
qualitative analysis part of the study is more prominent, priority has been given to 
saturation over representativeness.  
Thus, the cases were selected via purposive sampling from the JOs implemented at the 
external Southern border of the EU. Given that each JO is deployed in an individual 
Southern Mediterranean MS
17
, the selection was made also in order to ensure more 
contextual coverage by selecting JOs that were developed in different MSs. This 
ensured a higher external validity of results as they can be applicable to more contexts. 
Furthermore, since the study aimed at analysing participation in JOs over time, the time 
dimension was also important and only JOs deployed over the period 2007-2014 were 
considered. This scoped down the number of cases to JOs developed in Spain, Italy and 
Greece due to the fact that none of the rest of the MSs had JOs hosted on their territory 
which extended over the period of interest. George and Bennett (2005: 17) argued that 
when choosing cases for the analysis, they do not only have to be just “relevant” but 
they also have to provide the “kind of control and variation required by the research 
problem”. Thus, guided by the hypothetico-deductive premises set out for the two 
research questions, cases have been selected with the purpose of ensuring control and 
variance on the variables of interest (participation, security ‘threat’, HR) while avoiding 
extreme cases. Given that the JOs developed in Spain did not show significant variance 
on the factors of interest (migratory flows remained low over the years and HR issues 
were assessed as being minor when compared with other cases), the cases selected were 
JOs deployed in Italy (JO Hermes) and Greece (JO Poseidon). Both JOs showed 
variance on the factors of interest, as both were disposed on migratory corridors with 
high levels of irregular migration and both were strongly criticised for being connected 
to problems related to HR.  
 
  
                                                 
17
 The states considered to be Southern Mediterranean Border States were: Spain, Italy, Greece, France, 
Malta, Cyprus, and Portugal.  
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5.2.3 Data collection and analysis 
Departing from the aphorism stating that “the truth lies at the confluence of independent 
streams of evidence” (Deutsch in Coppedge, 1990: 467), the present paper sought to 
combine multiple streams of evidence in order to provide a solid response to the 
research question. The data was collected mainly from primary sources and in particular 
the Operational Plans (OPs) and the Evaluation Reports (ERs) of the JOs. JOs are 
guided by OPs and are finalised with an ER, which are agreed upon and drafted by the 
MSs together with Frontex. It was assumed that given that the OPs and ERs include 
participating MSs in the drafting process, they could contain information related to the 
core motivations for the development of the JO and for participation of MSs in the JO. 
Nevertheless, neither OPs nor ERs are publically available. Thus, a request for access to 
the documents for the JOs under study under Regulation 1049/2001 was made by the 
author of this paper to Frontex and partial access was granted
18
. Given that only partial 
access was obtained, the data was complemented with official reports, declarations, 
legislation, as well as secondary literature, in order to perform a contextual analysis that 
may uncover motivations for participation.  
5.2.3.1. Mixed methods: process-tracing and statistical analysis 
Given that the research explores the question of motivations and, secondarily, the 
question of patterns, mixed methods (Bryman, 2006: 98) have been employed to 
explore the four premises afore-delineated. Due to the nature of the motivations 
premises, qualitative research has been employed by theory-testing process-tracing 
which relied on documentary analysis and context analysis. Due to the limitations of 
document analysis, the research focused also on analysing the political context in which 
the JOs developed. This was assumed to shed light on the potential motivations of MSs 
to participate and corroborate findings of the document analysis.   
On the other hand, the assumptions related to patterns have been explored both 
quantitatively through statistical analysis and qualitatively. Notwithstanding this, the 
two streams of information should not be perceived as independent of each other as they 
fed into one another and  were brought on ‘common ground’ in the analysis.  
Given that the present paper used mixed methods, operationalization of the core 
concepts has been done both for qualitative and quantitative purposes. The 
operationalization of variables entails funnelling in from a broad background concept to 
a more systematised concept (conceptualisation) and operationalising the systematised 
concept in indicators based on which the researcher produces clear definitions (in the 
                                                 
18
 Partial access was obtained for the Evaluation Reports of JO Hermes 2008-2014, as well as for the 
Evaluation Reports of JO Poseidon Sea 2010-2014, and JO Poseidon Land 2010-2014. Additionally, 
Operational Plans for JO Hermes 2009-2014 were retrieved online from a platform created to facilitate 
access to restricted documents of the EU [http://www.asktheeu.org/]. 
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case of qualitative analysis), respectively scores (quantitative analysis) (Adcock and 
Collier, 2001: 530ff). This ensures rigorous research, as the enquiry relies on well-
defined concepts (for qualitative) and reliable and valid
19
 indicators (for qualitative). 
Additionally, concepts are sensitive to changes in their meaning over time (Coppedge, 
1999: 468, Adcock and Collier, 2001) and are sensitive to ‘contextual specificity’ 
(Adcock and Collier 2001: 534). These aspects were also considered in the 
operationalization of the variables. Particular attention has been paid to problems that 
affect measurement, namely reliability (in order to avoid random error) and validity (to 
avoid systematic error) (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 531).  
The following sections present the methods that were employed in order to answer each 
of the two research questions and the operationalization of the core concepts. 
5.2.3.2. Process-tracing  
In order to seek an answer to the first research question related to motivations, theory-
testing process-tracing (PT) was utilised and the analysis was performed over the period 
2007-2014
20
. Theory-testing PT is a within-case analysis method and “a powerful 
method of inference” (George and Bennett, 2005: 30) through which a theory 
(hypothesis) is deduced from existing literature and evidence is sought whether the 
hypothesised causal mechanism is present in the case studies (Beach and Pedersen, 
2011: 7ff.) Thus, theory-testing PT “traces the links between possible causes and 
observed outcomes” where the causes are hypothesised based on literature (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 6; see also Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Gerring, 2007). Unlike 
experimental design, PT is more Y-centred than X-centred, which means that the focus 
is on finding out “the causes of a specific outcome (Y) and not on the effects of a 
specific cause (X)” (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 80). Conceptualisation in theory-
testing PT is deductive and relies on logical reasoning to identify a causal mechanism, 
whereby X produces Y (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 7ff.). The groundings for 
conceptualisation and the hypothesised causal mechanisms of interest for this paper 
have been set in Chapter 4. Theory-testing PT relies heavily on empirical evidence 
gathered within-cases to make case-specific empirical inferences of the presence or 
absence of the hypothesised causal mechanism in each case. In the present study, 
descriptive empirical inference constituted a first step in the analysis of the cases, which 
formed the basis for inferring causal connections between the factors of interest and the 
outcome. By tracing the context of the development of the case through documentary 
analysis, the research generated a set of observations that allowed ascertaining the 
existence of causal connections between participation and the two factors of interest 
(presence of the threat, violations of HR).   
                                                 
19
 Measurement validity is concerned mainly with whether the scores accurately reflect the concept that 
the researcher is trying to measure (Adcock and Collier, 2001). 
20
 From the beginning of the implementation of JOs until presently. 
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Operationalization of key concepts 
Participation - has constituted the core dependent variable in the present study and is 
considered to be a “thick concept”, meaning that it can have multiple dimensions 
(Coppedge, 1999). For the purpose of both the qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
participation has been defined as the actual presence of a MSs in a particular JO. 
Although operationalizing participation as contribution (i.e. equipment and experts 
provided) would have allowed for a more nuanced analysis, the scarcity of information, 
as well as the sensitive character of such information precluded such operationalization. 
For the purpose of the quantitative analysis, the dataset has been composed by 
aggregating each MSs’ participation over time in the period analysed (see Appendix). 
Presence of a security ‘threat’ - given that security is no longer associated with military 
force, researchers argued for the existence of new types of ‘threats’ which can affect a 
state’s stability. Ceccorulli (2009: 2) interpreted “security in a broader manner as 
consisting of “unwanted foreign intrusion: defence of physical and psychological 
security, of economic interests of language and cultures”. This coupled with the 
definition of security provided above based on which security was seen as “continuum 
of normalcy” (Leonard, 2011: 238) allowed the formulation of a definition of the 
“threat”. For the purpose of this paper, ‘threat’ was interpreted as a disruption of the 
‘continuum of normalcy’ determined by an influx of irregular migrants. The increase or 
decrease in the presence of the ‘threat’ was assessed against participation in JOs and 
coupled with documentary analysis and analysis of the context of developments in order 
to determine whether a change in the presence of the ‘threat’ can be correlated with 
participation.  
Human rights violations – The analysis focused on major human rights violations in 
connection to JOs (e.g. incidents related to drowning, ‘push-backs’) and in parallel 
ascertained whether there was a change in the MSs’ attitude or interest in participation 
following such events.  
The analysis for both explanatory factors (i.e. threat and HR violations) focused first on 
gathering observations in parallel over the specified time-period 2007-2014 comprised 
in the OPs and ERs, as well as Frontex Reports related to potential motivations for 
participation. In addition to this, context analysis was performed in order to formulate 
descriptive inferences to determine whether a causal connection between the factors of 
interest and participation was present. Particular attention has been given to the 
sequence of observable evidence and the implications it had for the hypothesised 
explanation (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 7ff). Additionally, consideration has been 
given to a potential ‘lag effect’, as certain events connected to the hypothesised factor of 
interest may have not produced an immediate impact of the outcome of interest. Hence, 
the presence or absence of a causal connection between the factors of interest and 
participation was assessed. However, it is important to note that the study only explored 
causal connections, and not causal effects, and the causal mechanism was, to a certain 
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extent ‘black-boxed’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 9), which constitutes one of the 
limitations of the present study.  
5.2.3.3. Statistical analysis 
In order to answer the question of patterns, hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
(HMRA) has been utilised. Given the hypothesised, HMRA was assessed as being the 
adequate approach (although presenting some limitations) and was performed in order 
to explore the relationship between the explanatory factors and the dependent variable, 
while controlling for other explanatory factors (Pallant, 2010: 102ff; Agresti and Finlay, 
2014). Prior to conducting the analysis, preliminary analysis was conducted to ensure 
that the assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity 
were not violated (see Appendix).  
Operationalization of variables 
As can be observed from the assumptions made related to patterns/trends of 
participations, participation is viewed as being influenced by: (a) proximity to the 
border, (b) or with the degree of commitment to human rights. Proximity to the border 
has been operationalised by measuring the actual geographical distance between the 
host country of the JO (i.e. Greece, Italy) and the different MSs.
21
 For the purpose of 
operationalising commitment to human rights of different MSs, the World Justice (WJP) 
Rule of Law Index 2015 was utilised.
22
 The WJP Rule of Law Index compiles 
indicators for a number of factors and, inter alia, HR. The human rights indicator has 
been utilised.  
A great advantage of quantitative analysis is the ability to control for alternative 
explanations while testing the explanatory power of the factors of interest. However, 
alternative explanations must be based on valid theoretical assumptions. Given the ‘rule 
of thumb’ for the size of the sample that requires a significant number of observations 
for each predictive factor, the number of variables that was possible to be included was 
limited also by the number of existent observations (in this case by the number of MSs 
participating). Nevertheless, two control variables have been identified in the literature 
and included in the analysis. The literature on collective action and participation in 
burden-sharing schemes provides substantial evidence to show that the size of a state 
affects its participation in collective action initiatives. Size of a country has been 
assumed to skew the distribution of participation towards large MSs (Olson, 1970: 3; 
Thielemann, 2003: 236). Additionally, the strength of the connections that a MS has to 
another has been hypothesised to affect the degree of support that it is willing to provide 
to another state under pressure. MSs with closer connections will be more willing to 
                                                 
21
 For the operationalisation of proximity to the border, the following tool has been used: http://www. 
mapdevelopers.com/distance_finder.php 
22
 For the WJP Rule of Law Index see: http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/ 
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help one another in situations of pressure (Thielemann, 2003). This was understood as 
cooperation affinity of a MSs towards the host MSs.  
 Size has been operationalised based on the work of Crowards (2002) which identified 
four clusters of EU states based on size, namely ‘micro’, ‘small’, ‘medium-sized’, 
‘large’.23 Strength of connections between MSs or cooperation affinity has been 
operationalised by using the bi-dimensional cooperation map developed by Naurin and 
Lindhal (2010) in connection to patterns of cooperation between MSs in the Council 
Working Groups. The closest connection on the map (i.e. Italy-Spain) has been used as 
the smallest unit of measurement for the ties between different MSs and the host state of 
the JO (see Appendix). 
5.3 Limitations to the research design 
All methods are fallible and “contain gaping methodological holes” (Coppedge, 1999: 
465), however, acknowledging the limitations of a research design is an important step 
in mitigating or reducing their effects. The following section will present a series of 
limitations of the research design chosen to provide an answer to the two research 
questions. Despite being formulated as two independent research questions using 
different methods, the research process has been complex and interlinked and the 
streams of information gathered for providing an answer to the each question fed into 
one another. Thus, although presented independently for the purpose of clarity, the two 
research questions are interlinked and aim at shedding light upon the same 
phenomenon. In analysing the question of motivations, two premises have been 
formulated, which rely on a limited set of explanatory factors. However, political 
processes are complex phenomena that imply equifinality (i.e. multiple causality) 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 157). While acknowledging the limitations of the research 
design, the present paper chose to focus on a limited number of factors for the purpose 
of this research enquiry. 
An additional limitation of the study was imposed by the availability of data. Given that 
only limited research has been conducted on JOs and that most of the relevant 
documents are not publicly available or are restricted, this constituted an important 
challenge. A primary concern interlinked to the availability of data when it comes to 
social science research is the reliability of the findings (i.e. their accuracy) (Adcock & 
Collier 2001: 531). In order to ensure a high reliability of the findings, the present paper 
employed complementarity
24
 and triangulation (Bryman, 2006:105). Triangulation has 
                                                 
23
 ‘Micro’: Malta, Luxembourg; ‘Small’: Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia; 
‘Medium-sized’: Austria, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Norway, Czech Republic, Portugal, 
Denmark, Romania, Finland, Slovakia, Greece, Switzerland, Hungary, Sweden; ‘Large’: France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, UK 
24
 Entails: elaborating, enhancing and illustrating the results from one method with those of the other. 
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been employed at two levels in order to corroborate the findings namely: 
methodological triangulation
25
 and data triangulation
26
 (Cox and Hassard, 2010: 945). 
In terms of methods utilised, the theory-testing PT has as core limitation the fact that the 
causal mechanism was to a certain extent ‘black-boxed’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 9) 
which limited the ability to make clear-cut causal inferences. However, the present 
paper only sought to test causal connections. Moreover, one of the potential limitations 
of using statistical analysis is astutely caught in the maxim “correlation does not imply 
causation” (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014) which implies that the “demonstration of 
causality is a logical and experimental, rather than statistical problem” (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2014: 158). Due to this, the conclusions and inferences from both methods will 
be drawn cautiously.  
Last but not least, a primary concern has been the external validity of the findings (i.e. 
the capacity to generalise the findings) (King et al. 1994). Due to the relatively narrow 
scope of the study only prudent generalisations can be made to other cases. However, 
given the fact that the aim of the study was to scrutinise the validity of a set of 
hypotheses to well defined cases, generalisations of the findings can be made to cases 
presenting similar ‘contextual specificity’.  
 
                                                 
25
 Entails: use of multiple data collection methods. 
26
 Entails: use of multiple sources. 
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6 Analysis of the cases 
We are a community of eccentrics who share the delusion that politics is simpler than it 
appears (Coppedge, 1999: 467). 
 
The following chapter presents the empirical findings and analysis of the two cases. In 
an initial step, the answer to the question of motivations has been sought via process-
tracing, document and context analysis. In a second step, the secondary question of 
patterns and trends has been investigated by mainly quantitative analysis. This has been 
done for both cases. Thereafter, a cross-case comparison has been developed.   
6.1 Joint Operation Hermes and Italy 
Due to its geographical propinquity to the African continent, Italy has been one of the 
major destination countries for irregular migration coming from North Africa, in 
particular since the mid-2000’s, due to a displacement of flows from Spain (Andrade, 
2010). The Central Mediterranean route represents one of the main ‘arteries’ of irregular 
migration to the EU. To a lesser extent, migrants and smugglers also utilise the sea route 
from Egypt or Turkey to Apulia and Calabria (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 41; 
Frontex, 2015b). Migratory flows towards Italy are typically mixed comprising migrants 
from North-African, Sub-Saharan, and Asian countries that are headed regularly 
towards Lampedusa or Sicily as main destinations.  
As a response to the volatile situation in North Africa and the increased pressures on the 
Southern Mediterranean border of Italy, Frontex, in cooperation with Italy, as host 
country, and a set of MSs initiated JO Hermes. At its peak in 2013 and 2014, the JO 
Hermes clustered the efforts of approximately 20 MSs and SACs (Frontex, 2013a, 
2014a). Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the JO Hermes 2011 gathered 
the efforts of 13 MSs and SACs and a budget of over 14 million euro and was one of the 
most important operational activities developed by Frontex (see Frontex, 2011a). The 
following section will present a qualitative empirical analysis of MSs’ motivations for 
participation over time in JO Hermes (2007-2014). An overview of MSs’ participation 
per year is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Participation in JO Hermes per year and MS 
 
*Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia did not participate in the JO 
*Participation is marked with [X]. Host country [Italy] is marked in Yellow 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Frontex Annual Reports (2007-2014); Operational Plans JO 
Hermes, (2009-2014); Evaluation Reports JO Hermes (2008-2014) 
6.1.1 What are the motivations for MSs’ participation in JO Hermes? 
The context of JO Hermes and MSs’ Participation 
The calm before the storm (2007-2010) 
The JO Hermes was initiated in 2007 and re-activated in 2008 with the purpose of 
“coordinat[ing] operational cooperation between MSs […] through organising joint 
patrols […] in order to tackle illegal immigration across the external maritime borders” 
[emphasis added] as a response to the increasing migratory movements (Frontex, 2007b; 
2008b), which was a consequence of the displacement effect from Spain
27
. In this 
                                                 
27
 Prior to 2007, Spain was the main focal point for irregular migrants and human smugglers. The ‘Canary 
Crisis’ occurred in 2006 when an unexpected increase of irregular sea crossings took place from Western 
JO Hermes 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria X X X X
Belgium X X X
Denmark X X
Finland X X
France X X X X X X X X
Germany X X X X X
Greece X X X X
Hungary X X
Italy X X X X X X X X
Latvia X
Lithuania X X
Luxembourg X X
Malta X
Netherlands X X X
Poland X X X X
Portugal X X X X X X
Romania X X X X X
Slovakia X X
Slovenia X
Spain X X X X X X X X
Sweden X
UK X X X X
Norway X X X
Iceland X X X
Switzerland X X X X
Total MS/year 8 3 7 6 13 12 21 18
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context, the number of irregular migrants detected at the external borders of Italy grew 
exponentially throughout 2007 and 2008 (Frontex, 2007a: 14). In 2008, the number of 
detections at the Italian borders constituted 41% of the total sea border crossings 
towards the EU (Frontex, 2008: 12ff.). Although the upward trend constituted a reason 
of concern for the EU MSs, participation in the action in Italy was relatively modest 
both in 2007 and 2008, with only 7
28
, respectively 2 MSs participating in the JO, 
notably MSs in the immediate vicinity of Italy (e.g. France, Germany) or MSs that were 
confronting themselves with similar migratory issues (Spain, Greece, Portugal) 
(Frontex, 2007b, 2008b).  
The low participation rate may be a consequence of the fact that the JOs Hermes 2007 
and 2008 were among the first JOs and the MSs were still reluctant to participate in 
such initiatives. This was also signalled by the Evaluation Report (ER) of the 2008 JO, 
which highlighted an inflexibility of participating MSs to allow the National Officials to 
change the patrolling schedules as needed (Frontex, 2008b. 3). However, the analysis 
shows that participation was mostly security driven, given that the participating states 
were mostly states having a strategic interest in securing the borders (i.e. MSs in the 
immediate vicinity or confronting themselves with similar problems). Nevertheless, the 
JOs were also supported by the UK, for whom the situation was different. Given that the 
UK is not a Schengen state, its participation in JOs at the Southern border is quite 
surprising. A report realised by the UK in connection to Frontex-coordinated JOs shed 
light on potential motivations for participation. Firstly, the security-rationale was 
strongly embedded in the report which even went to highlight that “we [UK] can protect 
our borders better than the Schengen states control their own external borders” (House 
of Lords, 2008: 21). Furthermore, in addition to the security-driven rationale, a 
capability-driven motivation surfaced, given that the report stated that the UK wanted to 
“make use of its great experience in the efficient policing of borders to assist the other 
MSs” (House of Lords, 2008: 7). 
The security-driven approach towards migration was also reflected by the position 
adopted by the host state, Italy towards migration which, the analysis revealed, was only 
minimally contested by MS’s but strongly criticised by humanitarian organisations. 
Beginning with 2009, Berlusconi’s government put even more emphasis on ‘combating’ 
irregular migration and ensuring the security of the external sea borders became of 
paramount importance both to Italy and the other MSs. Hence, Italy concluded the 
Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation with Libya, which ensured an 
increased patrol of the seas surrounding the Italian border. Italy secured Libya’s 
cooperation in exchange for financial aid, which led the Minister of the Interior, 
Roberto Maroni, to declare that “Italy was investing to secure Europe’s borders and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Africa to the Canary Islands (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). At EU tier, the efforts were 
reinforced through the establishment of the JO Hera, initiated after the diplomatic tour d’Europe of the 
Spanish authorities who framed the crisis as an “unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the whole Europe” 
which required an “urgent European solution” (Carrera, 2007; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 
35ff.). 
28
 Note that the figures exclude the host MS.  
 33 
 
EU should take note” (in Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 607). This, coupled with 
the unilateral returns of migrants from Italy, led to a decrease in the numbers of 
migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea throughout 2009 and 2010 
(Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 607; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 41ff). 
In this context, JO Hermes 2009 was deployed with a duration of 6 months, gathering 
the efforts of only 6 MSs and had a modest contribution to ensuring border 
management, although being considered a success (Frontex, 2009a: 45; Frontex, 
2009b). In a similar manner as the 2007 and 2008 phases of the JO, the JO Hermes 2009 
had the aim to “tackle identified threats and risks” [emphasis added] (Frontex, 2009c) 
by performing border surveillance, which once again confirms the perception of 
irregular migration as a “threat” and the need of MSs to act out of a logic of anticipated 
consequences in order to mitigate the ‘threat’. Perceived in the broader political context, 
given the unilateral actions of the Italian government and the support from Libya, the 
risk of irregular migration was significantly reduced, which may offer a potential 
explanation as to why the number of states participating in JO Hermes 2009 was 
reduced. 
A ‘race against solidarity’29 for the prize of security (2011-2012) 
Following the political turmoil in Tunisia in January 2011, a sharp increase in the 
number of migrants coming from North Africa was registered, with as much as 5.160 
irregular migrants arriving in Lampedusa only in the period 1 January to 21 February 
2011 (Frontex, 2011d). The reception facilities and capacity of Lampedusa to face such 
an influx were overwhelmed, given that the island has a population of approximately 
5.000 people. By the end of August, more than 47.000 irregular migrants had arrived in 
Italy from Tunisia and Libya. Italian officials described the situation as a “biblical 
exodus” or a “human tsunami” (Spiegel, 2011), declared ‘state of emergency’ and urged 
the EU and Frontex to intervene. As a result, the JO Hermes 2011 was initiated in 
February 2011, 5 months earlier than initially planned and extended until March 2012 
(Frontex, 2011e; 2011c). The stated aim of the JO as presented in the OP was to 
“increase situational awareness, response, interoperability and performance to tackle 
identified threats and risks affecting the EU external borders” [emphasis added] 
(Frontex, 2011d: 3). Thus, the main goal of the operation was security and emergency-
driven and gathered the efforts of 12 MSs and SACs, which constituted a two-fold sharp 
increase in the number of participating states in comparison with previous years. 
Confirming the sense of urgency of the situation and concerns over border and internal 
security, Malta and Switzerland participated for the first time in JO Hermes due to their 
strategic interest in protecting their ‘own’ borders (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011). 
However, Malta postponed the decision of participation (Times of Malta, 2011) mainly 
due to a protracted disagreement with Italy over the clauses for disembarkation of 
persons. In 2010, the Council Decision on SAR and disembarkation in Frontex sea 
operations, which stipulated that in the event in which disembarkation in a third country 
                                                 
29
 Carrera et al., 2011. 
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would lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, then disembarkation 
should be realised in the country hosting the JO. This led to the unilateral withdrawal of 
Malta from participation in JOs, despite its strategic interest (Carrera, 2015: 9ff.). 
However, Malta’s involvement in JO Hermes 2011 can be seen through the lenses of the 
declaration made in the context of their participation in the ongoing JO Triton, in which 
context, Malta declared that they would be involved “in very exceptional cases, if 
security factors require it” (see Carrera, 2015: 9). 
The rationales behind such a reinforcement of the borders and the high participation of 
MSs were clarified by the Council Conclusions of March 2011. Although 
acknowledging the humanitarian emergency in Tunisia and Libya, the Council 
expressed its concern over the migratory movements and stressed the axiomatic 
importance of MSs’ participation in JO Hermes 2011, in order to “[…] improve the 
control and management of borders and [take] measures to facilitate the return of 
migrants to their countries of origin” (European Council, 2011: 4). Furthermore, the 
Council invited the JHA Council to meet without delay and draft a plan for developing 
capacity to manage migration and refugee flows. The subsequent JHA Council endorsed 
the Council Conclusions by urging MSs “to provide further human and technical 
resources to support the Agency’s operations, and in particular JOs Hermes, Poseidon 
Land and Sea and the possible deployment of a RABIT operation in Malta” (Council of 
the EU, 2011). This reinforces the idea that participation was driven mainly out of 
necessity and interest in securing not only the external borders but also each MSs 
‘national’ borders. 
Interestingly, the migratory crisis at the coastline of Italy did not only lead to lack of 
solidarity with the refugees involved in the crossing of the Mediterranean, but also 
created internal dis-unity leading to the questioning a fundamental principle of the EU – 
i.e. the free right of movement. In April 2011, Italy granted a number of 30.000 
migrants from Tunisia temporary residence permits for humanitarian protection, which 
gave the undocumented migrants the right to move freely in the Schengen area and 
legally enter other MSs (Carrera et al., 2011; Lusenti and Watanabe, 2014: 2ff.). In 
response to this, the French authorities took the decision of reintroducing border checks 
and stopping trains coming from Italy towards France at the border. Furthermore, 
similar measures were considered by states such as Germany (Deutsche Welle, 2011), 
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands (Carrera et al., 2011). The measure taken by 
Italy subsequently led to a discussion over the provisions of the SBC in order to enable 
the re-introduction of internal border controls in situations in which significant numbers 
of third-country nationals cross the external border, or when Schengen states 
persistently fail to protect external borders (Lusenti and Watanabe, 2014: 2ff). The 
“Franco-Italian affair” (Carrera et al., 2011) was a clear portrayal of the “weakest link 
technology”, meaning that “the smallest amount of the good provided by an individual 
actor determines the absolute amount of the public good available to all” (Ceccorulli, 
2009). In the case of the French-Italian row, this entailed that the amount of border 
security ensured by Italy directly reflected on the French internal security, which 
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increased the need for France to act by participating in measures that mitigate the 
vulnerability – such as in JO Hermes.  
Furthermore, this also led to a “race against solidarity” (Carrera et al., 2011; see also 
Den Hertog, 2011) and gave rise to tensions and lack of trust between MSs 
(Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 355). It can be inferred that France, as well as the 
rest of the MSs that reacted to the crisis were driven by the logic of anticipated 
consequences and cost-benefit calculations in their attempt to ‘close’ their national 
borders and protect their security. In the case of France, the cost of upholding the 
principle free movement of persons appeared to be only secondary to protection of 
internal security by preventing ‘unwanted’ migrants from entering the state. Moreover, 
solidarity with Italy, the state under pressure, was ‘securitised’. By extrapolation, it may 
be assumed that MSs’ interest in participating in this period was primarily security-
driven and spurring from an interest to protect themselves against an external ‘threat’, 
while the MSs at the periphery were ‘used’ as a ‘buffer zone’ protecting the ‘core 
countries’ of the EU. 
2011 was a crucial year also due to the fact that “precisely in the year the Mediterranean 
region was subject to the most surveillance, the largest amount of deaths or 
disappearances were recorded” (ECRE, 2011). Despite the fact that Frontex reported 
that JO Hermes “saved over 20.000 migrants at sea during search and rescue 
operations” (Frontex, 2012d), UNHCR (2012) reported that 1.500 persons lost their 
lives attempting to cross the Mediterranean in 2011. However, one incident in particular 
caught the attention of the international community, namely a “boat-left-to-die” in the 
Mediterranean despite there being a high military and police presence at sea (ECRE, 
2011). The investigation by the Council of Europe (CoE) concluded that the incident 
had happened due to a “catalogue of failures” at sea (Council of Europe, 2012) by SAR 
teams and NATO vessels present at sea (Den Hertog, 2012). The reaction of the EU 
MSs was modest, which could also be due to the fact that the collective responsibility 
for the tragedy in the Mediterranean was shifted on the shoulders of NATO and 
individual MSs that had sea presence during that period and it was considered to be a 
‘collective failure’(Council of Europe, 2012). Furthermore, in spite of such events, Italy 
continued the pursuit of border security through the bilateral repatriation agreement 
concluded with North African states (Carrera et al., 2012: 3ff.), which led to a decrease 
in migratory flows during 2012 (Frontex, 2011d), ensuring security for both Italy and 
the other MSs at the cost of protection of refugees.  
Ambivalent answers to new storms (2013-2014) 
However, in 2013 and 2014, an upward migratory trend was registered with over 
170.000 irregular migrants making the crossing of the Mediterranean only in 2014 
(Frontex, 2014a). This was coupled with an increasing death toll due to accidents 
related to overloaded boats, which peaked in 2013 with the incident near Lampedusa 
when a boat carrying hundreds of migrants capsized. As a consequence of this, and due 
to a slow reaction on behalf of the EU, from October 2013 to October 2014, the Italian 
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Navy Operation Mare Nostrum was deployed – primarily a unilateral30 and military 
action (Carrera and Den Hertog, 2015: 4). In parallel to the Italian operation, JO Hermes 
2013 was initiated by Frontex and gathered the participation of 20 MSs. This is in the 
context in which previously, even in the unfolding of the “biblical exodus” of 2011, the 
participation of MSs was approximately half of the participation in 2013, i.e. 12 MSs 
participated in 2011. A comparison of the original OP and the ER of JO Hermes 2013 
points out that initially only 13 MSs committed their participation, which means that the 
rest of the MSs’ joined the operation during the course of its development. Rationales 
for this can only be assumed, but in the context of the tragedy unfolding at the “door-
steps” of the EU, and the pervasive criticism for the lack of a reaction, this could have 
constituted an impulse for more MSs’ participation (Frontex 2013c, 2013d). 
The EU leaders’ response to the crisis in Lampedusa came through the voice of the 
European Council in October 2011, who called for the “reinforcement of Frontex 
activities in the Mediterranean and along the South-Eastern borders of the EU” 
(European Council, 2013a, 2013b) and requested the development of Eurosur, which 
was envisaged to “detect vessels and illegal entries, contributing to protecting and 
saving lives at the EU's external borders” (European Council, 2013a, 2013b). Critics 
argued that “in response to the arrival of migrants in Lampedusa, the EU sought to 
expand its securitisation concept to include new measures and tools of identifying 
irregular migrants, preventing entry (European External Border Surveillance System – 
Eurosur) and ensuring forced return” (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 599), 
which essentially indicates a security-driven motivation of MSs to act through 
participation in JOs. On the other hand, it is interesting to note the emphasis put by the 
Council on safeguarding human life. This happened in the context in which previously it 
turned a ‘blind eye’ on similar smaller scale tragedies and on the customary ‘push-
backs’ performed by Italy and Syria, which essentially went against the principle of 
non-refoulement of the EU. 
Due to the termination of Mare Nostrum, and the pervasive calls for a commensurate 
response on behalf of the EU, JO Hermes 2014 (Frontex, 2014d, 2014e) was upgraded 
to the new JO Triton
31
 which has the aim of better controlling irregular migration and 
contributing to SAR in the Mediterranean (Frontex, 2014c; Commission, 2014). Hence, 
a shift can be noted from a primarily security-oriented functionality of the JOs to also 
SAR functionality. Although not in the scope of the present study, it is impossible not to 
touch briefly upon the events that unfolded in 2014-2015 in the context of JO Triton. 
Despite the fact that the OPs and Evaluation Plans of JO Triton are not publically 
available, Frontex announced that 26 MSs are currently taking part in JO Triton 2015 
(Frontex, 2015c). This is notable, especially given that such a high participation was 
only noted in 2013 and 2014 in the aftermath of the Lampedusa tragedy. In connection 
with such a high mobilization, Frontex stated that “[w]e have dramatically increased the 
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 Italy was supported by Slovenia.  
31
 JO EPN Hermes and JO Aeneas, which was active only from 2011, were merged into the new JO EPN 
Triton concept (see Frontex, 2014c).  
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deployment levels in the Central Mediterranean to support the Italian authorities in 
controlling its sea borders and in saving lives, too many of which have already been 
tragically lost this year” [emphasis added] (Frontex, 2015c). Moreover, at the 
Extraordinary Council meeting on migration of 2015, one of the 10 points on the future 
strategy for management of migration was constituted by the reinforcement of JO Triton 
and Poseidon. This is connected in the Council statement primarily with “prevent[ing] 
further loss of life at sea” and secondly with tackling irregular migration (European 
Council, 2015).Thus, a shift in the purpose of JOs can be noted -  from primarily 
‘combating’ irregular migration to primarily ‘saving lives at sea’, thereby safeguarding 
HR. Nevertheless, military measures were integrated in parallel in the migration agenda. 
In June 2015, within the scope of EU’s Comprehensive Approach to migration, a 
military operation was launched in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR 
MED), with the aim of systematically identifying and capturing vessels that are 
suspected of being used by migrant smugglers (EEAS, 2015). It is notable that this is 
“the first time after 10 years” that migration was put on the Foreign Ministers Agenda 
(Mogherini, 2015). 
Interestingly, this shift is reflected also in the statements of EU leaders which previously 
were primarily concerned with securing the external borders against the migration 
‘threat’. In this sense, the Italian foreign minister underlined that the ‘duty of saving 
lives’ lies not only on the Italy but also on the other EU MSs and asked for MSs 
reinforcement in operations in the Mediterranean (The Guardian, 2015a). As a reaction 
to the pressures from Italy but also from humanitarian organisations, the leaders of 
Germany, France and the UK pledged assistance in the SAR operations (The Guardian, 
2015b). The case of the UK is highly relevant as it had previously criticised and 
opposed JOs considering them an “undesirable ‘taxi service’” and a ‘pull factor’ for 
migrants (Carrera and Den Hertog, 2015: 5). Shifting their position, the UK has 
currently pledged support to the SAR operations through JO Triton. Nevertheless, the 
UK took safeguards in order to secure a deal that would not imply taking the 
responsibility for the saved migrants at sea (The Guardian, 2015b). 
As an overall preliminary conclusion, the evidence gathered through process-tracing 
supports the idea that, at an aggregate level participation of the MSs was mainly 
security-driven and constrained by the presence and level of the irregular migration 
‘threat’. This has been evidenced both by the document and context analysis. However, 
generalizations must be made with caution, given the multiplicity of potential rationales 
for participation and the diversity of MSs. Nonetheless, apart from the security-driven 
participation, the ‘securitisation’ of solidarity among MSs also came as an additional 
argument to reinforce the fact that the preferences of MSs are mainly security driven. In 
more recent years, the EU MSs preferences are blurred and ambivalent as they continue 
to be tightly connected with the security-driven motivation, constrained by the persistent 
presence of the ‘threat’ and a logic of consequence, but also connected to normative-
motivations, constrained prima facie by exogenous pressures to act.  
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Figure 2: Detections of irregular migrants on Central Mediterranean route 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Frontex (2015a) 
6.1.2 What patterns of participation in JO Hermes can be perceived? 
The present paper also set out to test two hypotheses that were drawn based on 
theoretical underpinnings and literature on the topic in connection to patterns, namely 
that countries closer to the border, for which the presence of the ‘threat’ is allegedly 
higher will participate more, respectively that provided that violations of HR are 
pervasive, countries which are more committed to human rights will participate more. 
For this purpose, the ability of proximity to the border and commitment to HR to predict 
levels of participation was assessed using HMRA. In the first step the influence of 
country size and cooperation affinity was controlled for. The control variables were 
found to explain 42% of variance in participation. In the second step, after entering the 
two variables of interest (i.e. proximity to the border and commitment to HR), 47% of 
variance in participation was explained with a high statistical significance (99%). In this 
context, the factors of interest together explained an additional 8% of the variance in 
participation, as demonstrated by the R
2 
change of 0.82 (significant at 95%). In the final 
model
32
, commitment to HR appeared to also make a strong contribution to explaining 
the dependent variable (standardised Beta=.340) at a significance level of 95%. 
However, proximity to the border does not appear to have a significant explanatory 
power.  
Thus, based on this, the results seem to suggest that, on an aggregate scale, participation 
can be explained to a great extent by commitment to HR. This supports, to a significant 
extent, the hypothesis that MSs that are more committed to HR participate more in JOs 
than those with a lower level of commitment, which is relevant and interesting in the 
context of the afore-delineated increase in concern for human right. On the other hand, 
surprisingly proximity to the border appeared not to have a significant explanatory 
                                                 
32
 In the final model, both size (standardised Beta=.451), followed by cooperation affinity (standardised 
Beta=-.419) showed statistical significance levels above 99% and appeared to have a strong contribution 
to explaining the dependent variable. 
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potential. This refutes the null hypothesis that the countries closer to the focal point of 
entry into the EU are more willing to participate. An explanation for this could come 
from the fact that the perception of the ‘threat’ may be more homogenously perceived 
among MSs, which is why most of them participate at one time or another. This is also 
reinforced by the qualitative analysis which shows that concerns about security are 
pervasive among MSs as the core purpose for participating in JOs is to ‘tackle irregular 
migration’. 
6.2 Joint Operation Poseidon and Greece  
Although prior to the 1990’s, Greece was one of the net outward migration states, due to 
its accession to the EU and to the Schengen Area (2000), it became one of the new 
immigration states being strongly affected by migration from Asia and North Africa. 
The external border management situation in Greece is even more complex than in Italy, 
given that there are multiple points of irregular entry both by sea and by land. Since 
2007 in particular, the main entry point in Greece was through the maritime border with 
Turkey. However, due to increased sea surveillance, migration was displaced 
predominantly to the land border in the period 2010-2012. Starting with 2013 and 
continuing at present, the situation at the maritime border of Greece became dire, from 
both a border management perspective and a humanitarian perspective, as migration 
was concentrated at the Aegean Sea (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 612). 
Greece does not constitute only a destination, but also a very important transit country 
for irregular migrants into the other EU MSs. By the end of 2010, approximately 90% 
of the people detected irregularly in the EU had entered through Greece (McDonough, 
2012: 2) In this context, the concept JO Poseidon was developed in response to the 
increasing pressure on the Greek borders and represents one of the most complex 
operational concepts developed under the coordination of Frontex, involving both sea 
and land
33
 operations and being active in multiple operational areas. As presented in the 
following, both the JO Poseidon Sea and Land gathered the support of a significant 
number of MSs in almost all phases of the development (see Table 2). Being interlinked 
and given that at the beginning the two operations were combined into one, JO Poseidon 
Sea and Poseidon Land will be discussed together in the following. While following a 
systematic year-by-year approach to the analysis, the subsequent section focuses only 
on the crucial findings for each of the JOs relevant for the assumptions afore-delineated. 
The paucity of the information in connection to JO Poseidon, which is also highlighted 
by scholars (see Marin, 2011: 476), limited the scope of the analysis and made the task 
at hand more challenging.  
                                                 
33
 Most of the land border between Greece and Turkey is actually constituted by the river Evros, which is 
also considered to be a highly dangerous and difficult crossing point for irregular migrants. 
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Table 2: Participation in JO Poseidon Sea and Land per year and MS 
 
*Participation is marked with ≈ / JO Poseidon Sea; ∆ / JO Poseidon Land; X / Both JOs Poseidon  
*Host country [Greece] is marked in Yellow 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Frontex Annual Reports 2007-2014; Evaluation Reports JO 
Poseidon Land and JO Poseidon Sea 2010-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
JO Poseidon Sea/Land 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria ≈ ∆ X X X X X X
Belgium ∆ X X X X ∆ X
Bulgaria X X X ∆ ∆ X X
Croatia ∆ ≈ X X
Czech Republic ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Cyprus ≈ ∆ ∆ X ∆ ∆
Denmark X ≈ X X X X X
Estonia ∆ X X X ∆ X X
Finland ∆ X X X ∆ X X
France ≈ X X X X X X X
Germany ≈ ∆ X ∆ X X X X
Greece X X X X X X X X
Hungary ∆ X X ∆
Italy X X X X X X X X
Latvia ≈ X X X X X X X
Lithuania ≈ X X X ∆ ∆
Luxembourg ≈ X ≈ ∆ X
Malta ≈ ≈ ≈ X ∆ X X X
Netherlands ≈ ≈ X X X X X X
Poland ≈ X X X X X
Portugal ≈ X X X X X X
Romania ≈ X X X X X X X
Slovakia ∆ X X X ∆ X X
Slovenia ≈ X X ∆ ∆
Spain ≈ X ∆ ≈ ∆ X
Sweden ≈ X ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ X X
UK ≈ X X X X X X ≈
Norway ∆ X ≈ X X X
Switzerland ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Iceland ≈ ≈ ≈ ≈ X
Total MS/year 15 22 25 28 29 29 26 24
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6.2.1 What are the motivations for MSs’ participation in JO Poseidon? 
The context of JO Poseidon and MSs’ participation 
‘Securitised’ land and sea border (2007-2009) 
Similarly to Italy, Greece began registering an increasing number of irregular border 
crossings at its sea and land borders with Turkey beginning with the mid-2000. Only in 
2007, Greece reported an increase of 170% in irregular border crossings in comparison 
to the previous years, which were mainly concentrated around the maritime borders but 
also around the land border with Albania (Frontex, 2007a). This trend persistently 
continued throughout 2007 and 2008 but the largest share of irregular border crossings 
were on the border with Albania (Frontex, 2008a: 12). As a response to the increased 
pressure, JO Poseidon Sea 2007 and JO Poseidon Sea 2008 were deployed and were 
supported with assets and experts by 14, respectively 13 MSs. In parallel, JO Poseidon 
Land was deployed at the land border but gathered the support of only 2 MSs (2007) 
(i.e. Bulgaria and Italy), respectively 17 MSs (2008). 
The OPs and ERs for JO Poseidon Land and Sea could not be analysed for these years 
given the fact that access to them was not granted. However, it may be inferred by 
analysing the context and other reports, that the relatively low participation rate in the 
case of Poseidon Land could be accounted for by the fact that Albanians constituted a 
large share of the migrants attempting to enter Greece, which were crossing the border 
mainly for economic reasons with most migrants taking seasonal jobs in Greece and 
necessarily not moving further in the EU (Frontex, 2015b). Thus, the perception of the 
‘threat’ in this period by the rest of the MSs could be considered as relatively low and 
mostly connected to irregular border crossing across the maritime borders. Furthermore, 
in this period the Greek coast guard was reportedly systematically refouling irregular 
migrants and refugees by pushing small boats out of the national waters (see Baldaccini, 
2010: 241ff.), which essentially prevented them from entering Greece or moving to 
other EU countries. The practices of Greece of refouling refugees were met with 
criticism from humanitarian organisations, and the EU MSs were also criticised for not 
acting upon their commitments. ProAsyl noted that the practices of MSs in Greece 
“illustrat[ed] the decreasing commitment of EU Member States to guarantee even basic 
human rights standards” (ProAsyl, 2007: 5), which suggests the presence of normative 
exogenous pressures on the EU MSs to act. 
The ‘other’ Greek crisis 34(2009-2011) 
Beginning with 2009, due to the effects of the concluded agreements of Italy with 
Libya, respectively of Spain with Senegal and Mauritania, a displacement effect of the 
migratory flows from North Africa took place and the Turkish-Greek land border 
became a major “hotspot” for irregular migration, which peaked in 2010. The sudden 
shift of the migratory flow towards the land border was due to a cumulus of factors 
including, inter alia, the de-mining of the Evros region at the land border with Turkey 
                                                 
34
 McDonough and Tsourdi, 2012. 
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(Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 612). Initially, the JO Poseidon Land 2010 was 
deployed with the purpose of controlling the border. The ER stressed the “high level of 
solidarity to Greece” shown by 24 MSs and SACs which participated in the JO. 
However, the ER also stressed that the efforts were not sufficient in the context of the 
pressures on the border, as the number of daily detections amounted to 245 (Frontex, 
2010h: 5). Due to this increase, on 24 October 2010, the Greek Government requested 
immediate assistance at the external border to tackle an “exceptional mass inflow of 
immigrants”, much as in the case of Italy in 2011. The following day, Frontex and the 
other MSs announced that they intended to support Greece in solving the “serious 
situation” by increasing “the control and surveillance levels at Greece’s external border 
with Turkey” (Frontex, 2010e) via the deployment of the RABITs. This was the first 
time the mechanism had been used and no other use was made until now. Given the 
“compulsory solidarity”, i.e. obliged participation, of the RABITs, the actual 
participation in this exercise does not offer a valuable insight into rationales for 
participation. However, the purpose of the RABIT exercise, i.e. “tackling the current 
exceptional and urgent situation of irregular migration towards Greece with a desired 
deterrence effect, and to demonstrate well-coordinated operational solidarity of the EU 
MSs to render effective border security at the EU external borders” (Frontex, 2010g: 4), 
which replaced JO Poseidon 2010 that was already in place, shows that the action was 
mainly emergency and security-driven. Scholars contested the proportionality of the 
measure and argued that the activation of the RABITs, although presented at EU level 
as a sign of “European solidarity”, was mostly an illustration of EU MSs priorities: 
“more security (Frontex) and not going at the heart of the issue, which is that of human 
protection of refugees and undocumented migrants” (Carrera and Guild, 2010: 15).  
The measure must also be interpreted in the broader context of the asylum policy. Given 
the deficiencies of the Greek asylum system, some MSs (Belgium, Sweden, 
Netherlands, UK) were constrained to stop ‘sending back’ asylum seekers to Greece 
despite having first entered through Greece.
35
 Thus, the emergency-driven response can 
also be viewed as a measure to counter such situations in which, due to humanitarian 
reasons and constrained by the deficient asylum and border management systems of 
border states as Greece, the other MSs would be in the position of having to process the 
asylum applications and tackle the ‘burden’ of ‘unwanted’ migrants. Similarly, Carrera 
and Guild (2010: 1) observed that the deployment of the RABITs also signalled the 
“limits of the principle of solidarity and fair-sharing of responsibility and the failure of 
the EU Dublin System”, where solidarity is to be understood both between MSs and 
with the refugees attempting to reach the EU. They argue that the “deployment is 
merely of an emergency, temporary and (in)security (police)-driven nature, and the 
strengthening of the common EU external land border between Greece and Turkey may 
further increase the tensions by enlarging the distance between the external border 
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 In 2010, under the ‘Dublin system’ the principle of ‘first safe country’ was applicable. This essentially 
entailed that the first country through which a migrant claiming asylum entered was the one processing 
the asylum application. 
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control practices and Europe’s commitment to the rights and freedoms of asylum-
seekers and refugees” (Carrera and Guild, 2010). 
In the context of the activation of the RABITs, JO Poseidon Land 2010 was suspended 
for a period of two months and reactivated at a later stage. In parallel to the JO Poseidon 
Land, JO Poseidon Sea 2010 gathered the support of 24 MS and, for the first time, they 
included two SACs, Norway and Iceland. From the perspective of violations of HR, the 
RABIT intervention was criticised at EU level due to the inhumane and degrading 
treatment of migrants. The Human Rights Watch (2011) noted that “ECtHR 
categorically ruled that the transfer of migrants to detention in Greece would expose 
them to prohibited abuse, an executive agency of the EU and border guards from EU 
member states knowingly facilitate such transfers”. It should be duly noted that border 
guards of other MSs need to be authorised by their home state in order to perform such 
activities. To a great extent, this refutes the assumption that MSs participate due to HR 
violations and reinforces the argument for the security-driven motivation. 
As a follow up to the RABIT exercise, the JO Poseidon Land 2011 was established 
gathering the participation of 24 MSs. The 2011 ER for Poseidon Land sheds light upon 
potential rationales for participation in the JO as it noted that the JO had “coordinate[d] 
the EU MSs operational solidarity to render border security at the EU external borders” 
(Frontex, 2011h). Furthermore, it highlighted the fact that “having entered Greece 
successfully, a large portion of these migrants intend to travel to other EU countries, as 
their final destination is Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden and France” 
(Frontex, 2011h: 5). It may be inferred that ‘operational solidarity’ at the external 
borders and participation of the MSs in JOs has the main purpose of safeguarding the 
individual preferences of MSs and their ‘own’ internal and border security.  
The cost of security (2012-2013) 
The porous borders of Greece have also attracted criticism by the other EU ministers. In 
a similar manner as in the case of Italy, the ‘migration crisis’ generated a ‘solidarity 
crisis’ between MSs. In 2012, seven EU ministers questioned the principle of free 
movement due to the lax border controls at the Greek borders, alluding to the possibility 
of reinstating border checks if the migratory situation was not controlled. In this sense, 
the German Minister Hans Peter Friederich noted “the question still remains what 
happens when a country is not capable of securing its borders, as we see in Greece. […] 
Is it possible to reinstate border controls? […] I want to clarify that as part of our 
discussion”. In addition to this, they emphasised the need to strengthen Frontex’s 
operational activities at the Greek-Turkish border (Euractiv, 2012). This signals not 
only a “Schengen crisis” (Brady, 2012) or a ‘solidarity crisis’ with the MSs under 
pressure, but indirectly also indicates the underlying rationales for MSs participation in 
Frontex-coordinated JOs at the external borders of Greece, i.e. to safeguard their own 
national interests of security even at the cost of one of the fundamental principles that 
unites the EU – the free movement of persons. 
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The displacement of the migratory flows to the maritime borders starting with 2012 (see 
Frontex, 2012a: 9) was coupled with a commensurate response as the JO Poseidon Sea 
2012 was supported by 22 MSs including Norway and Iceland. The JO ER emphasised 
ever since the beginning that Greece represented a concern as “it is mainly a transit 
region for irregular migrants heading to the EU” (Frontex, 2012e: 1) and that “migrants 
detected in the East Ionian Sea were apprehended while trying to reach Italy” (Frontex, 
2012e: 4). Interestingly, in 2012, the operational area of Poseidon was extended to cover 
the border between Greece and Italy. Thus, the sea patrols deployed by the MSs were 
utilised not only to control the influx of migration from the ‘outside’ towards Greece, 
but also from Greece towards other MSs, which reinforces the migration-‘security-
threat’ nexus and uncovers the interests of MSs. An analysis of the OPs for 2012 and 
2013 has been performed in a report from 2012 by a Human Rights organisation. While 
acknowledging potential bias in interpretation, given that the OPs have been interpreted 
from the point of view of a human rights agency, it can be observed that the report 
mentions that the aim of the JO, as stated in the OP was “to identify the arrival of an 
embarkation as quickly and as far from the border as possible (early detection) and to 
‘control secondary migration flows’” (secondary migratory flows meaning movements 
from Greece towards other MSs) (FIDH et al., 2013: 34). Notably, the ER of the JO 
Poseidon 2012 is also the first one
36
 that mentioned that “besides surveillance and 
security, it is important to highlight the humanitarian aspects” (Frontex, 2012e: 4), and 
went ahead to underline that 33 SAR interventions were performed during the JO 
Poseidon Sea, which saved the lives of 966 migrants.  
A “humanitarian crisis within the economic crisis”37(2013-2014) 
Although the overall amount of detections on the Eastern Mediterranean corridor 
decreased towards the end of 2012 and in 2013, an increasing trend in migration across 
the maritime border was registered throughout 2013, and the migratory flow was 
composed by a large share of Syrian nationals seeking asylum (Frontex, 2012a: 54). In 
parallel, a decrease in the number of detections at the land border was mainly due to the 
deployment of the Greek operation Aspida (“Shield”) but also due to the reinforcement 
of JO Poseidon Land. At the maritime border, JO Poseidon Sea 2013 was supported by 
experts and equipment provided by 20 MSs including Iceland and Norway. However, 
apart from emphasizing the importance of border surveillance in connection to the 
reinforcement of the maritime border in Greece, the Frontex 2013 Report (2013a: 16) 
also emphasised the contribution that JO Poseidon Sea had to SAR actions by 
emphasising that “rescuing people in distress at sea was one of the key elements 
highlighted during 2013 maritime joint operations” (Frontex, 2013a: 64). 
From the beginning of 2014, the maritime borders of Greece were increasingly under 
pressure with over 50.000 migrants arriving only in one year. The OP of JO Poseidon 
Sea 2014 stated that the operation enabled MSs to “tackle identified threats and risks 
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 From the ones analysed by the author in the period 2009-2014 for which only limited access was 
available. 
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 Alexis Tsipras (Reuters, 2015). 
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affecting maritime borders” (Frontex, 2014f: 11) and that “the deployment of human 
resources has been adequate to the level of the threat regarding irregular migration 
[emphasis added] (Frontex, 2014f: 12). However due to the humanitarian crisis 
unfolding in the Mediterranean, increased attention to HR could be observed in the JO 
Poseidon Sea 2014 ER which highlighted that UNHCR was involved in operational 
briefings regarding HR. JO Poseidon Sea 2014 was initially planned for the period May-
September, however, due to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, deployment was extended.  
As in the case of JO Hermes, JO Poseidon Sea was set at the centre of the EU’s 
migration agenda of the Extraordinary Council on Migration from 2015 and is currently 
the second largest and most important JO deployed in the Mediterranean (European 
Council, 2015). Moreover, an increasing concern over the “humanitarian crisis” 
unfolding even currently, has led to pressure on the EU to act by reinforcing its sea 
presence. In this sense, the UNHCR as well as the Prime-Minister of Greece called the 
situation “shameful” and called upon the EU to act (Reuters, 2015). The reaction of the 
EU MSs to this external pressure appears to be ambivalent, just as in the case of Italy, 
and the overall response was pooling resources under the JO Poseidon Sea operation in 
order to decrease the humanitarian crisis but also to secure the borders. Moreover, even 
SAC states, such as Norway signalled their concern by sending rescue vessels to “sail to 
Greek waters to assist in the ongoing humanitarian disaster that is now unfolding in the 
Mediterranean” (Royal Norwegian Embassy in Athens, n.d). 
To sum up, evidence pointed out that, as in the case of JO Hermes, participation in JO 
Poseidon was initially security-motivated and driven by the exogenous constraints 
spurring from the presence of the migration ‘threat’ and the vulnerabilities imposed by 
the Schengen system and the free movement principle. Nonetheless, to a certain extent a 
shift in priorities occurred in connection to the JO Poseidon, starting roughly with 
2012/2013, as the JOs Poseidon and, more precisely, Poseidon Sea were increasingly 
connected to SAR necessities and the ‘duty’ to react to the humanitarian crisis.  
 
Figure 3: Detections of irregular migrants on Eastern Mediterranean route (sea, land and total) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Frontex (2015a) 
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6.2.2 What patterns of participation can be perceived? 
Similar to the case of JO Hermes, a HMRA was performed in order to test the two 
hypotheses of interest. This shed light on the ability of the two interest factors to predict 
participation, while controlling for the effect of size and cooperation affinity. In the case 
of JO Poseidon, the statistical results are rather puzzling. In the first step, the control 
variables appeared not to explain variance in participation. In the second step, the 
addition of the factors of interest did not show an increase in the explanatory power of 
the model either. The final model including all 4 variables was not statistically 
significant. However, despite not being statistically relevant, HR and size showed the 
largest standardised Beta coefficient (standardised Beta=.307; respectively Beta=.274). 
This disproves both initially formulated null hypotheses, refuting the idea that countries 
closer to the border or countries more committed to HR participated more. One rationale 
for this may be the fact that there was insignificant variance on the dependent variable 
and, as a consequence of that trends and effects may have been blurred.  
When analysing the standardised Beta coefficients in the final model, there is some 
indication that HR and size make a contribution to explaining variance in participation, 
however, the results are not statistically significant. Moreover, the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between participation and size of the country shows a positive correlation 
between the two, which means that larger countries participated more over the period 
(size: r=.312; p=.050). Thus, the results of statistical analysis seem to suggest that on an 
aggregated scale and in this particular case, participation was not explained by the factor 
of interest variables or by the control model.  
6.3 Discussion: Cross-case comparison 
The following sections will discuss the findings of the two cases and provide an answer 
to the research questions. Firstly, the question related to motivations for participation 
will be tackled through a cross-case comparison of the findings and, thereafter, a 
discussion related to the findings for the second research question, regarding patterns, 
will be provided. 
6.3.1 Motivations for participation: between endogenous and exogenous 
‘constraints’ 
The afore-delineated empirical analysis (sections 6.1.1 and 6.2.1) focused on JO 
Hermes, respectively Poseidon Land and Sea, and analysed the context in which the JOs 
developed in the period 2007-2014. The initial research question concerned motivations 
for MSs’ participation and set out to identify what other types of ‘incentives’ or 
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‘constraints’ could explain participation in JOs. The paper provided two potential 
explanatory premises for motivations for participation from the perspective of the logic 
of consequences and the logic of appropriateness, namely: (a) the presence of a security 
‘threat’, which was correlated to exogenous ‘constraints’ encourage MSs action 
(security-driven motivation); (b) the occurrence of violations of HR, in which case 
participation was related to either endogenous ‘constraints’ (acting out of a ‘moral 
duty’), or to exogenous ‘constraints’, spurring from external pressure put by external 
actors on the MSs to act in order to safeguard the ‘normative’ image of the EU (norm-
driven motivation). The analysis was guided by theoretically grounded hypotheses and 
performed for both cases. A set of cross-case conclusions can be drawn from the 
analysis. 
Firstly, in both the case of Italy and Greece, an increase in irregular migration was 
registered from the beginning of the mid-2000 as a result of a displacement effect of 
migratory flows from Spain. In this context, the JO Hermes, respectively JO Poseidon
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were deployed. The OPs and ERs appear to suggest that the initiative had a security-
driven underlying motivation and participation of MSs was linked to the interest in 
controlling the migration ‘threat’. Although overall higher in the case of JO Poseidon 
than in the case of JO Hermes, participation has shown an upward increase over the 
period under analysis. The higher degree of participation in JO Poseidon may be 
connected with the more limited capacity of Greece to control the borders, the porous 
nature of its borders, and the fact that by 2010, approximately 90% of the total of 
irregular persons detected in the EU MSs had entered through Greece (McDonough, 
2012: 2). 
The analysis showed that both in the case of JO Hermes and of JO Poseidon, exogenous 
‘constraints’ and the presence of the irregular migration ‘threat’ (as stated in the 
Operational Plans and Evaluation Reports of the JOs) appeared to be a strong catalyst 
for participation. Yearly increases of the migration ‘threat’ were followed by increases 
in participation, which may suggest a causal connection between the two. A cumulus of 
evidence suggested this causal connection. Firstly, in both cases, the analysed 
documents appeared to indicate a strong concern of MSs over the provision of the 
‘collective goods’ – border security and internal security – but principally at ‘national’ 
level, and thereafter at EU level, and in numerous cases migration was referred to as a 
‘threat’ to the stability of MSs. Although stronger evidence could be gathered in the 
case of JO Poseidon, an overarching concern presented in the reports was related to the 
fact that both Greece, respectively Italy acted as transit states for irregular migrants 
attempting to reach other EU countries. This may be an additional catalyst for 
participation in order to safeguard national interests.  
Secondly, the analysis of the context of migration in both Greece and Italy uncovered 
two sets of events that not only showed the ‘securitized’ nature of “European solidarity” 
both with the MSs under pressure and with refugees/migrants, but also revealed the 
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 From here onwards JO Poseidon will be used to denote both JO Poseidon Sea and JO Poseidon Land. 
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underlying interests and preferences of MSs – securing their own ‘national’ borders and 
providing ‘national’ internal security. In both cases analysed, the ‘migratory crisis’ 
generated a ‘Schengen crisis’ and a ‘solidarity crisis’, although in the case of Italy the 
crisis was more pronounced and led to the re-introduction of effective border controls at 
the border with Italy. Thus, as a consequence of the increased number of irregular 
migrants entering through Greece and Italy and the ‘risk’ of movement to other EU 
states, some EU states including, inter alia, France (most notably), Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands, went as far as questioning one of the fundamental principles of the 
Union – the principle of free movement. In Italy’s case, this happened in 2011, being 
triggered by the Italian government’s decision to issue temporary residence permits to 
undocumented migrants, which angered the other EU MSs. Similarly, in Greece’s case, 
this occurred in 2012, when due to the high secondary migratory movements from 
Greece to other EU states, the EU MSs reacted by threatening with the re-introduction 
of border controls. As afore-argued, this seems to suggest that the MSs actions were 
constrained by ‘exogenous’ pressures (the presence of the ‘threat’) and it may be 
inferred that MSs participated in JOs mainly due to security concerns which were 
concealed under the façade of ‘solidarity’. Mitsilegas (2014) argued in the context of 
asylum policy that solidarity can be seen as interconnected with interest and necessity 
and arising from a “crisis mentality” (Mitsilegas, 2014: 187). Moreover, he argued that 
solidarity can be securitised and can be seen as “emergency management” (Mitsilegas, 
2014: 187). Similarly, the high participation of the MSs in both migratory ‘crises’ but 
also the adjacent measures taken by individual countries lead to the conclusion that their 
actions were driven by security motivations and spurred from a logic of consequences. 
Nonetheless, in both cases, due to the increasing death toll in the Mediterranean and 
persistent violations of HR, at both the Italian and Greek borders, and due to the 
increased criticism and exogenous pressures on MSs to respect HR (in particular the 
right for life and human dignity of undocumented migrants), a steady shift in the scope 
and nature of JOs could be perceived from a JO – border/internal security nexus to a JO 
– search and rescue nexus. Additionally, the empirical data suggested ambivalent MSs’ 
preferences, given that on the one hand, the security-driven motivations for participation 
appear to be maintained constant, while on the other hand, an increasingly norm-driven 
motivation for participation could be noted. Nevertheless, in both cases, it is unclear 
whether the norm-driven motivation for participation and concern for HR were 
ultimately constrained by exogenous pressures from external actors (e.g. humanitarian 
organisations) or whether they were imposed endogenously, due to the internalisation of 
norms by the MSs.  
However, one must be cautious about stating that a clear shift has taken place, in 
particular due to the fact that the security and ‘threat’ driven discourse was observed to 
continue in parallel to the discourse regarding the ‘moral duty’ to save lives and the 
calls for ‘solidarity’ with the migrants/refugees risking their lives. Additionally, the 
increased concern over HR especially noted in the analysed documents (OPs and ERs) 
 49 
 
could have also been the consequence of a structural shift in the approach towards JOs 
due to the adoption of the Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy in 2011. 
Thus, while prudent conclusions can be drawn from the analysis concerning this aspect, 
one must not overlook the political dynamics that occurred recently in the event of 
tragedies in the Mediterranean. The shift in some state’s view, from declining interest in 
participation in JOs Hermes and Poseidon, to high participation and commitments to 
‘saving lives’ in the Mediterranean (e.g. the case of the UK participation), is an eloquent 
example of this shift. Moreover, references to the normative duty of the EU to ‘save 
lives’ reverberate the MSs’ discourse, as well as that of EU leaders. Recently, Juncker 
(2015) highlighted in connection to JOs and the situation in the Mediterranean “The 
core priority [of the MSs] is to save human lives. This is urgent and we will strengthen 
the means to save lives”.39 
Overall, the analysis suggested that a synergy of factors appear to account for 
participation and that the line between acting from a logic of consequence or a logic of 
appropriateness is increasingly blurred. Moreover, on a general level a shift could be 
perceived from acting collectively through JOs to generate border and internal security 
(in particular for individual MSs), as collective goods, to also acting collectively to 
generate protection of refugees and undocumented migrants at sea, which was also 
presented as having characteristics of collective good at the beginning.  
6.3.2 Patterns of participation in Joint Operations 
The secondary research question was related to patterns of participation in JOs. In this 
sense, for both JO Hermes and JO Poseidon a HMRA was performed with the purpose 
of testing the two hypotheses of interest, i.e. that countries closer to the border, for 
which the presence of the ‘threat’ is allegedly higher will participate more, respectively 
that provided that violations of HR are pervasive, countries which are more committed 
to human rights will participate more. The two hypotheses, formulated based on 
theoretical underpinnings set out potential patterns of participation. The results were 
highly different for the two cases, and in the case of JO Poseidon they were not 
statistically significant. Despite the fact that further tests could have been conducted to 
test the two hypotheses, the scope of the present study precluded it. Thus, although a 
comparison between the two cases is limited, a set of conclusions can be drawn.  
In both cases, the findings from the cases show that the effect of proximity to the border 
is negligible and has no statistical significance. Thus, the results refute the hypothesis 
presented initially, challenging the idea that MSs should participate according to the 
distance from the focal point of entry of irregular migrants in the EU, which essentially 
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 Author’s translation; Original quote: “La toute première priorité consiste à sauver des vies humaines.  
L'urgence est immédiate et il faudra que nous renforcions les moyens pour sauver les vies” (Juncker, 
2015). 
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Adjusted 
R2
R2 
Change
Stand. 
Beta
Adjusted 
R2
R2 
Change
Stand. 
Beta
Model 1 ,426*** ,034
Size ,486** ,302
Cooperation affinity -,350* -,077
Model 2 ,473*** ,082* ,002 ,041
Size ,451** ,274
Cooperation affinity -,419* -,156
Human rights ,339* ,307
Proximity to the border -,100 -,187
Hermes Poseidon
relied on the assumption that “threats travel more easily over short distances than over 
long ones” (Ceccorulli, 2009: 4). However, at the same time, this might also appear to 
suggest the idea that the perception of ‘risk’ associated with the porous borders and 
irregular migration moving inward to the EU is rather homogenous at EU level due to 
the fact that the free movement principle allows both irregular migrants, as well as bona 
fide travellers to move from one MS to another once entered in the EU (Triandafyllidou 
and Maroukis, 2012: 40, 45; Brian and Laczo, 2014: 86). Thereby, all MSs have an 
equal interest in securing the external borders and participating in JOs.   
On the other hand, commitment to HR showed a statistically significant effect on 
participation only in the case of JO Hermes. However, in the case of JO Poseidon 
despite the fact that HR showed the most effect on participation in the model, the result 
was not statistically significant. As presented in the qualitative analysis, the presence of 
HR violations was pervasive both in the case of JO Hermes and JO Poseidon, as such, it 
was initially hypothesised that MSs with a higher commitment to HR will be more 
likely to participate, given the fact that JOs coordinated by Frontex also present HR 
safeguards. While this hypothesis appeared to be supported in JO Hermes, as states with 
higher commitment to HR appeared to participate more over the period analysed, this 
was not the case for JO Poseidon. As afore-mentioned, given the more uniformly 
distributed and high level of participation in JO Poseidon, the statistical effects might 
have been blurred. Put in the perspective of the qualitative analysis, which showed that 
over time, HR became increasingly important in connection to JOs, this comes to 
reinforce (to some extent) the conclusions drawn from the qualitative analysis. 
Figure 4: Hierarchical regression analysis results   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Source: Author’s results 
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7 Conclusion  
Joint Operations have an axiomatic importance in the border management policy of the 
EU, constituting a form of operational cooperation at the external border and being 
coordinated by Frontex and implemented by MSs. Departing from the theoretical 
underpinnings of collective action, this paper argued that JOs constitute forms of 
collective action, as they imply the participation of two or more MSs in view of 
achieving a commonly sought collective good. In the case of JOs, it has been argued 
that the commonly sought collective good is represented by security, both at an 
‘intermediate’ level – border security – as well as at a ‘finite’ level – internal security, 
but that there are also other indirectly generated collective goods – i.e. protection of 
refugees/migrants).  
Despite sharing a collective interest in the provision of the collective good(s), the theory 
of collective action purports that “members of a large group […] will not act to advance 
their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or […] 
some separate incentives” (Olson, 1970: 2). In the case of JOs, it has been ascertained 
that participation in JOs is voluntary and that institutional ‘coercion’ (legally binding 
provisions) is not present. Based on the collective action theory, the voluntary nature of 
participation and the lack of ‘coercion’ have been perceived as conditions conducive to 
free-riding behaviour. Nevertheless, empirical data shows that, in fact, participation of 
MSs in JOs is significant. This led to a theoretical and empirical ‘puzzle’ regarding the 
question of motivations for participation and as a secondary enquiry related to the 
question of patterns for participation. Guided by the theoretical underpinnings of the 
logic of anticipated consequences and the logic of appropriateness and literature on 
participation/burden-sharing in migration and asylum policies, the present paper 
advanced two premises related to potential motivations of MSs’ participation, 
respectively two hypotheses related to potential patterns.  
At the core of the EU border management policy and the development of JOs lies the 
principle of solidarity which, it has been argued, might have a potential influence upon 
the willingness of MSs to participate. Nonetheless, moving past the elusive concept of 
‘solidarity’, the paper has suggested two potential motivations for participation in JOs, 
namely: (a) the presence of a security ‘threat’, which was correlated to exogenous 
‘constraints’ that might determine MSs to act (security-driven motivation); (b) the 
occurrence of violations of HR, in which case participation was related to endogenous 
‘constraints’ (acting out of a ‘moral duty’), or to exogenous ‘constraints’- participation 
being constrained by external pressure on the MSs to act in order to safeguard the 
‘normative’ image of the EU  (norm-driven motivation).  
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The findings of both the case of JO Hermes (Italy) and the case of JO Poseidon (Greece) 
appear to suggest that MSs mainly participated in the JOs being guided by security-
driven motivations due to exogenous ‘constraints’ generated by the presence of the 
migration ‘threat’ (logic of consequence). One of the most salient findings of the thesis 
was that, in the event of high internal security ‘threats’ generated by high irregular 
migration, the national security interests took centre stage overshadowing even the core 
principles and values of the EU – the principle of free movement and the principle of 
solidarity. In contrast to what has been assumed at the beginning, namely that solidarity 
is a guiding principle for the actions of MSs, the analysis seemed to suggest that 
solidarity is “state-centred, in that it places emphasis on the interests of the state […] 
securitized [and] exclusionary” (Mitsilegas, 2014: 187) not only towards the irregular 
migrants/refugees, but also in-between MSs themselves. This seems to go in line with 
the argument made by some scholars that “the political power of security can attempt to 
appropriate solidarity for its own ends” (Ross in Mitsilegas, 2014: 187) and reinforces 
the security-driven motivation for participation. 
Concurrently, due to an increased gravity of HR issues connected to JOs, a more 
ambivalent position of MSs’ preferences in connection to participation in JOs could be 
perceived. In particular beginning with 2011, both security-driven motivations and 
norm-driven motivations appeared to be connected to MSs’ participation. In this sense, 
evidence has been collected in the process of the present enquiry which seems to 
suggest an increasingly important link between JOs and the ‘moral duty’ of the EU to 
protect lives. By extrapolating, the paper has argued that participation in JOs can be 
seen as spurring from a ‘normative duty’ to protect HR. Nonetheless, it has not been 
possible to infer whether the constraint to act in order to protect HR was generated 
endogenously, due to the internalisation of norms and values by the MSs, or 
exogenously, i.e. due to external pressures on the EU to act to safeguard the core values. 
The collected evidence did seem to suggest a continuous exogenous pressure on EU 
leaders to act to safeguard lives, which may have acted as a catalyst for increased 
participation in JOs. Overall, a steady shift from a main concern of the MSs with the 
provision of border security and internal security (in particular at national level), as 
collective goods, to also a concern over the provision of protection of refugees and 
undocumented migrants, which has been argued to have collective good attributes, 
could be noted.  
Similar to the question on motivations for participation, two hypotheses for patterns of 
participation were tested primarily through quantitative analysis, i.e. countries closer to 
the border, for which the presence of the ‘threat’ is allegedly higher will participate 
more in JOs, respectively that provided that violations of HR are pervasive, countries 
which are more committed to human rights will participate more. The analysis provided 
evidence to support the argument that countries more committed to HR participate more 
in JOs, which is interesting in the context in which the qualitative analysis appeared to 
show an increasing causal connection between respect for HR and participation over the 
analysed period.  
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Potential avenues for further research are plentiful, especially given that JOs have been 
the object of only a handful of studies. On one hand, for those passionate about 
qualitative analysis, a potential idea could be assessing the salient issue that was only 
touched upon in the present study – i.e. explaining why a soaring death toll was 
registered in which the presence of the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean was high. 
Such a study can look into the question of ‘collective failure’ and international 
coordination. On the other hand, for those passionate about quantitative studies, the 
increasing trend in participation in JOs from the inception until presently could offer an 
interesting puzzle.  
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9 Appendix 
 
 
a. Maps  
 
b. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis assumptions 
 
c. Dataset 
Explanations to dataset: 
Participation – aggregated participation of each MSs over the period 2007-2014. In the 
case of JO Poseidon, participation was aggregated for both JO Poseidon Land and Sea. 
Each individual participation (either in the JO Poseidon Sea of JO Poseidon Land) of a 
MSs was scored with 1 point. If a MSs participated in both Sea and Land, they were 
scored with 2 points.  
Human rights and close ties – the data marked with (*) was missing, the data gaps were 
filled by using average scores for similar countries.      
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a. Maps 
Figure 5: Migratory routes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Frontex Operational data 
Figure 6: Irregular migration city hubs and routes 
 Source: European Council (2015) 
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Participation 
Hermes
Size of the 
country
Cooperation 
affinity Human Rights
Proximity to 
the border
Participation Hermes 1,000 ,597 -,504 ,167 -,111
Size of the country ,597 1,000 -,317 ,000 -,127
Cooperation affinity -,504 -,317 1,000 ,275 ,348
Human Rights ,167 ,000 ,275 1,000 ,569
Proximity to the border -,111 -,127 ,348 ,569 1,000
Participation Hermes ,000 ,003 ,193 ,284
Size of the country ,000 ,047 ,499 ,256
Cooperation affinity ,003 ,047 ,074 ,032
Human Rights ,193 ,499 ,074 ,001
Proximity to the border ,284 ,256 ,032 ,001
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
Poseidon 
Participation
Size of the 
country
Cooperation 
affinity Human Rights
Proximity to the 
border
Poseidon Participation 1,000 ,312 -,117 ,103 -,050
Size of the country ,312 1,000 -,132 ,000 -,093
Cooperation affinity -,117 -,132 1,000 ,459 ,351
Human  Rights ,103 ,000 ,459 1,000 ,709
Proximity to the border -,050 -,093 ,351 ,709 1,000
Poseidon Participation ,050 ,273 ,297 ,399
Size of the country ,050 ,247 ,499 ,316
Cooperation affinity ,273 ,247 ,006 ,031
Human Rights ,297 ,499 ,006 ,000
Proximity to the border ,399 ,316 ,031 ,000
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
 
b. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Assumptions: 
 
(a) Multicollinearity (relationship between independent variables): As can be seen from the 
figures below this assumption has not been violated in any of the cases. Multicolinearity 
appears when the independent variables are highly correlated. The absence of 
multicollinearity has been corroborated also by checking the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). 
 
Table 3: JO Hermes 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Table 4: JO Poseidon 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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(b) Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity – has been checked by looking at the Normal 
Probability Plot. The distribution was assessed as being normal and linear and there was no 
indication of heteroscedasticity. 
Figure 7: Normal probability plots 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
(c) Outliers - can be detected by looking at the scatterplot. Outliers are characterised by a 
standardised residual level of more than 3.3 or less than -3.3. As can be seen below, this was 
not the case.  
 
Figure 8: Scatterplots 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author’s compilation
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c. Dataset 
 
 
ID Hermes 
Participation
Poseidon 
Participation
Proximity 
Hermes IT
Proximity 
Poseidon EL
Fundamental
Rights
Size Cooperation 
affinity 
Hermes IT
Cooperation 
affinity 
Poseidon EL
Austria 4 14 1047 1201 0,87 2 45 59
Belgium 3 12 1506 1949 0,84 2 22 27
Bulgaria 0 12 936 236 0,67 2 17* 8*
Croatia 0 6 909 702 0,67 2 17* 8*
Cyprus 0 7 1695 835 0,65* 1 18 3
Czech Republic 0 4 1270 1311 0,8 2 41 53
Denmark 2 13 1982 2166 0,91 2 31 45
Estonia 0 12 2452 2192 0,81 1 54 68
Finland 2 12 2605 2438 0,91 2 44 58
France 8 15 1004 1575 0,78 3 6 19
Germany 5 13 1162 1375 0,87 3 20 35
Greece 4 n/a 662 n/a 0,65 2 14 n/a
Hungary 2 6 1087 972 0,65 2 47 60
Iceland 3 6 3804 4165 0,9* 1 35* 50*
Italy n/a 16 n/a 502 0,74 3 n/a 14
Latvia 1 15 2275 1990 0,8* 1 51 66
Lithuania 2 9 2033 1785 0,79* 1 46 61
Luxembourg 2 7 1486 1886 0,85* 0 29 33
Malta 1 12 168 846 0,74* 0 19 12
Netherlands 3 14 1625 2000 0,85 2 23 37
Norway 3 10 2529 2610 0,9 2 35* 50*
Poland 4 11 1455 1296 0,77 3 36 49
Portugal 6 13 1805 2640 0,8 2 6 13
Romania 5 15 1130 650 0,73 2 20* 30*
Slovakia 2 12 999 1167 0,72* 2 45 57
Slovenia 1 7 974 1099 0,77 1 36 47
Spain 8 8 1185 2049 0,78 3 1 15
Sweden 1 11 2040 2120 0,9 2 30 46
Switzerland 4 4 1024 1451 0,87* 2 45* 59*
United Kingdom 4 14 1918 2389 0,79 3 22 37
